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THE MARYLAND ORDER OF ABATEMENT
OF LEGACIES AND DEVISES
By RussELL R. RENO*
Because of the usual lapse of time between the date of
the execution of a testator's last will and the date of his
death, the executor often finds that the assets available for
distribution among the legatees and devisees are insuffi-
cient to satisfy all of the provisions in the will as contem-
plated by the testator. This may be due to: (1) the fact
that the estate was depleted between the date of the execu-
tion of the will and the testator's death, or (2) the neces-
sity of using a large portion of the assets in order to pay
the debts of the deceased, or (3) the use of a large portion
of the assets to pay taxes, usually the Federal Estate Tax.
This situation raises the problem of the priority rights of
the various types of legatees and devisees to payment in
full of their respective legacies and devises. This order of
priority in payment, where the assets are insufficient to pay
all, is the inverse of the order of abatement of legacies and
devises for the purpose of paying debts of the estate and
costs of administration.
HisT ocAL DovELO NT
In the development of the feudal system in England, the
protection of rights in land came within the jurisdiction of
the manor courts, while the administration of decedents'
estates came under the control of the ecclesiastical courts.
As a result of this division in jurisdiction, the principle
became firmly established that the title to real property
devolved directly to the heir in case of intestacy or to the
devisee in case of testacy, and that only personal property
passed to the administrator or executor as an asset of the
estate. As a consequence of this devolution of title, real
property was not subject to the debts of the deceased, ex-
* A.B., 1931; LL.B., 1927, University of Illinois, LL.M., 1940, Columbia
University; Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
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cept in the cases of debts arising out of specialties and then
only if the specialty was expressly made binding on the
debtor's heirs. In such cases the heir became bound by
contract upon the decedent's debt to the extent of the real
property inherited from the debtor. But even in this case
of a debt arising on a specialty which expressly bound the
heir, the debtor could defeat the right of the creditor to
reach the realty by devising the land to persons other than
the heir at law. In 1691 the Act against Fraudulent Devises1
was enacted making the devisee of land subject to liability
for specialty debts of the testator on the same basis as
the heir.
Thus in colonial Maryland land of the decedent was not
subject to his simple contract debts, but only to his specialty
debts and then only if the specialty expressly bound the
heir.2 To eliminate this distinction between specialty debts
and simple contract debts of the decedent, the Act of 1785s
was enacted making the real property of the decedent sub-ject to the claims of all types of creditors of the estate after
the personalty has been exhausted. This statute has the
effect of making the personal property of the decedent in
the hands of the administrator or executor the primary
source of funds for the payment of the debts of the estate,
and only permits equity to intervene and sell the realty
in the hands of the heirs or devisees upon proof of an in-
sufficiency of personal property in the estate to pay such
debts.
Since the Act of 1916 Directing Descent 4 provides for
the descent of real property to the same persons who are
the distributees of the personal property and in the same
proportions, there is no financial loss in case of intestacy
to any heir from the application of this principle that ex-
hausts the personalty in the payment of the debts before
touching the realty. As the heirs taking the realty are the
same persons as the distributees taking the personalty and
take in the same proportions, it is immaterial to them
whether the personalty or realty is sold first to pay debts.
But in the case of a will, the devisees of the realty may be
entirely different persons from the legatees of the per-
sonalty. Thus in the case of testacy the application of this
principle may operate to deprive the legatees of all or a
major portion of their share in the estate, while leaving
13 W. & M. Ch. 14, 2 Ar . BRIT. ST. (2d ed. 1912) 781.
2Van Bibber v. Reese, 71 Md. 608, 18 A. 892 (1889).8 MD. CoDE Supp. (1957), Art. 16, Sec. 254.
'MD. CODE (1951), Art. 46, Sec. 1.
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the devisees their entire share without diminution for pay-
ment of the debts or costs of administration.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has consistently taken
the position, that in the case of testacy as well as in the
case of intestacy, the realty cannot be reached for the pay-
ment of debts until the personalty has been exhausted;5
unless the testator has by the terms of his will shown an
intention to exonerate all or part of the personalty from
the payment of debts, or has shown an intent to charge
the payment of some or all of the legacies against his realty.
Although the testator cannot by his will remove personalty
from the reach of his creditors, he can charge the realty
with the payment of his debts and exonerate any or all
personalty from such payments.' In such cases the legatees
are entitled to have equity sell the realty for the payment
of decedent's debts without first exhausting the personalty.
But a mere direction in the will to pay all debts before the
devises and bequests are paid cannot in itself be a basis for
charging the realty with the payment of the debts jointly
with the personalty.7 On the other hand, many states have
taken the position that the blending of the residuary realty
and personalty into a single clause does show an intent to
charge the residuary realty with the payment of general
legacies, thereby exonerating these general legacies from
the payment of the debts at the expense of the residuary
realty.8 Certainly it can be argued, that where a testator
disposes of his residuary realty and personalty in a single
clause to the same person, he has shown an intention to
treat residuary realty and residuary personalty the same,
and that he was thinking of the residue as consisting of
both realty and personalty remaining after all other dev-
isees and legatees in his will had been paid in full. Yet
even in this situation the Maryland Court of Appeals has
5 However, in the case of specialty debts expressly binding on the heir,
which by the Act against Fraudulent Devises, supra, n. 1, are also binding
on a devisee, the specific devisee of realty becomes primarily liable under
the terms of specialty. In Chase v. Lockerman, 11 G. & J. 185 (Md., 1840),
the Court of Appeals held that a specific legatee whose property Is used
to pay specialty debts of the estate has a right of contribution against a
specific devisee. Likewise, in Knox v. Stamper, 186 Md. 238, 46 A. 2d 361
(1946), this possibility was recognized but taxes and administration ex-
penses were held to be simple contract debts and not to be classified as
specialty debts. Because of the disappearance in business usage of special-
ties expressly binding on the debtor's heirs, It is doubtful as to whether this
right of contribution in the specific legatee against the specific devisee has
any significance today.
I Buchanan v. Pue, 6 Gill 112 (Md., 1847).
White v. Kaufman, 66 Md. 89, 5 A. 865 (1886).
8 Michigan Trust Co. v. Driver, 270 Mich. 698, 259 N. W. 867 (1935) ; In
re Kendrick's Estate, 210 Wis. 218, 246 N. W. 306 (1933).
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taken the position that the intent to exonerate the general
legacies from the payment of the debts at the expense of
the residuary realty and to charge the residuary realty with
the payment of such general legacies cannot be read from
the words of the will.' Under these cases neither intestate
realty, residuary realty, nor realty specifically devised
could be used to pay debts until all of the personalty had
been exhausted, and likewise the general legacies were
not payable out of either residuary or intestate realty.
In 1894 the first breach in this historic principle occurred
with the enactment of the present statute which makes "the
real estate of every testator not specifically devised" charge-
able with the payment of pecuniary legacies, where the
personalty is insufficient after payment of debts, unless
the contrary intent clearly appears. 0 This statute uses the
words "not specifically devised" in describing the realty
charged with the payment of general pecuniary legacies.
These words clearly include realty devised in the residuary
clause, whether it is a single clause blending both residuary
realty and residuary personalty together, or whether it is
a separate residuary devise to a person other than the resi-
duary legatee; but the wording is ambiguous as to whether
it includes intestate realty where the will contains no resi-
duary devise. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals
has construed these words to include intestate realty as
well as residuary realty." This leaves only realty included
within a specific devise still subject to the old principle
that personalty is the primary fund for the payment of
debts, and that realty cannot be charged with the payment
of general legacies.
PREsENT ORDER OF ABATEMNT
The effect of this statute, in making both intestate and
residuary realty subject to the payment of pecuniary gen-
eral legacies, is to create a revised order of abatement as
follows:
1. Intestate Personalty. Under common law principles
any intestate personalty was the first source of funds for
the payment of debts of the estate. Normally there can be
no intestate personalty if the will contains a residuary
legacy; but if the residuary legacy or any part thereof is
$White v. Kauffman, supra, n. 7; Pearson v. Wartman, 80 Md. 528, 31
A. 446 (1895), where the clause "the remaining portion of my estate" was
used.
10MD. CODE (1951), Art. 93, §361.
1 St. Johns Church v. Dippoldsmann, 118 Md. 242 84 A. 373 (1912).
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void, then intestate personalty may exist in the hands of
the executor for the payment of debts of the estate.
2. Residuary Legacy. As just pointed out, if the will
contains a valid residuary legacy, there can be no intestate
personalty, and the residuary personalty becomes the first
source of funds for the payment of debts of the estate. The
very use of the term "residue" shows an intention to charge
the general legacies against the residuary personalty, so
that the residuary legacy must abate in favor of the general
legacies. 2
3. Intestate Realty. Here also there will normally be no
intestate realty if the will contains a residuary devise.
But often wills are executed without a residuary devise
where the testator has disposed of all the realty that he
owned at the date of the execution of the will by specific
devises. Likewise, a residuary devise may be void in its
entirety or in part; and also under Maryland case law
realty devised by a void specific devise passes as intestate
realty and does not fall into the residuary devise." Prior
to the enactment of the Act of 1894" such intestate realty
could not be subjected to the payment of the debts of the
estate until all the personal estate had been exhausted. 5
This meant that neither specific legacies nor general legacies
could be exonerated at the expense of the heirs taking the
intestate realty. Now this statute changes this rule to the
extent of making intestate realty subject to the payment
of pecuniary legacies. It should be noted that the statute
uses the term "pecuniary legacies", which comprises all of
the usual general legacies found in a will,0 but does not
include specific legacies. This presents two problems of
"England v. Prince George's Parish, 53 Md. 466 (1880); Church Ex-
tension M. E. Church v. Smith, 56 Md. 362 (1881).18 Disposition of Void and Otherwi8e Failing Devises in Maryland, 2 Md.
L. Rev. 142 (1938).
11 Supra, n. 10.
'3Chase v. Lockerman, supra, n. 5, lists the order of abatement at com-
mon law as follows:
1. Personal estate.
2. Lands devised to be sold for the payment of debts.
3. Lands descended.
4. Estates specifically devised even though they are generally
charged with the payment of debts.
"Cases have often construed a gift of a certain number of shares of stock
or a sum of money in bonds, without describing the particular stock or
bonds other than by the name of the corporation, as being a general legacy.
Dryden v. Owings, 49 Md. 356 (1878). In such cases if the stocks or bonds
are not in the estate at the testator's death, the legacy Is treated as a
pecuniary legacy payable out of general assets. Robinson v. Addison, 2
Beav. 515, 48 Eng. Rep. 1281 (1840) ; Mecum v. Stoughton, 81 N. J. Eq. 319,
86 A. 52 (1913). Under this reasoning all such general legacies can be
considered pecuniary legacies and within the Act of 1894.
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interpretation: first, can the executor petition equity for
the sale of the intestate realty upon a showing that the per-
sonal estate will be insufficient to pay the debts and the
general legacies; and second, if the personal estate is ex-
hausted in the payment of the debts so that the pecuniary
legatees are entitled to payment out of the intestate realty,
are the specific legatees also entitled to reimbursement from
the intestate realty?
The first question was answered in St. Johns Church v.
Dippoldsmann17 where the executor instituted suit in equity
to have the intestate realty sold to pay the pecuniary lega-
cies, the personal estate being insufficient after payment of
debts. The Court held that the executor had no authority
to bring this suit, but only the pecuniary legatees, who had
not received full payment of their legacies, were entitled
to maintain a suit in equity to enforce the lien of their
legacies against the intestate realty. It should be noted
that in this case there was sufficient personal estate to pay
all of the debts, and the suit was instituted by the executor
solely to obtain funds for the payment of the pecuniary
legacies. If the debts had exceeded the personal estate,
then a different conclusion might have been reached on
the theory that by the express terms of the Chancery Act18
the executor has authority to institute a suit in equity for
the sale of the decedent's realty where the personal estate
is insufficient to pay the debts and costs of administration.
But whether the suit is instituted by the pecuniary legatees
themselves or by the executor, the ultimate result is to
abate the intestate realty to pay the debts, thereby exoner-
ating the pecuniary legacies from abatement so long as the
intestate realty is sufficient.
This then presents the second question, namely, whether
the specific legacies can also be exonerated from the pay-
ment of the debts at the expense of the intestate realty. Two
different situations can exist: first, the debts of the estate
exhaust the personalty not specifically bequeathed, such
as the cash on hand, but not the specific chattels which
have been specifically bequeathed by the will. In that case
the general pecuniary legatees would be entitled to pro-
ceed against the intestate realty, and thereby in result the
specific legacies as well as the general pecuniary legacies
have been preferred over the intestate realty. Thus in-
testate realty has abated in favor of both specific legatees
17 Supra, n. 11.
8 MD. CODN, SuPP. (1957), Art. 16, §254. Likewise, MD. CODE SuPP. (1957),
Art. 93, §315, confers concurrent jurisdiction upon the Orphans' Courts
where the appraised value of the real estate does not exceed $2500.
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and general pecuniary legatees. The second situation is
where the debts of the estate exceed the general funds of
the estate so that the specific chattels that have been
specifically bequeathed must also be sold to pay the debts.
Then the question arises as to whether these specific leg-
tees have any right to have the intestate realty charged
with the payment of their specific legacies in the same
manner as the general pecuniary legacies. The Act of 1894,1'
charging the pecuniary legacies upon all realty not specifi-
cally devised, is silent as to specific legacies; so it might be
assumed that the common law principle, making the per-
sonal estate the primary fund for the payment of debts,
applies in a conflict between the intestate realty and specific
legacies. Under such reasoning we would have a result
where the intestate realty would be abated in favor of the
general pecuniary legacies but not in favor of the specific
legacies. In effect the general pecuniary legacies would be
paid in full while the specific legacies would be abated to
pay the debts. This is contrary to the accepted principle
of the common law that between general legacies and
specific legacies, the former should be abated in favor of
the latter.2" The Court of Appeals has not passed on this
problem to date, but it is the author's opinion that the Act
of 1894 should be construed as showing an intention to
make all realty not specifically devised subject to abate-
ment in favor of both specific legacies as well as general
pecuniary legacies. Certainly a testator has as great an in-
tent to have specific legacies paid in full as he has to have
pecuniary legacies paid in-full. And if realty not specifically
devised should be charged with the payment of the latter
it should also be charged with the payment of the former.21
4. Residuary Devise. Prior to the enactment of this Act
of 1894,22 residuary realty like intestate realty could not
be subject to the payment of the debts of the estate until
all the personal estate had been exhausted. With the en-
actment of this statute residuary realty along with intestate
realty became charged with the payment of pecuniary lega-
19 S upra, n. 10.
2 Negro Cornish v. Willson, 6 Gill 299 (Md., 1848) ; Nash v. Smallwood,
6 Md. 394 (1854).
This argument can be stated in the following form:
Specific legacies are preferred over general legacies under common
law principles.
General pecuniary legacies are preferred over intestate and residuary
realty by statute.
Therefore specific legacies are also preferred over intestate and resi-
duary realty.
MD. CODE (1951), Art. 93, §361.
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cies.23 This then raises the same two questions of interpre-
tation of the statute discussed in connection with intestate
realty. If the author's interpretation of the statute is cor-
rect as making both intestate realty and residuary realty
subject to abatement in favor of both specific legacies and
general pecuniary legacies, then the only problem remain-
ing is whether intestate realty must abate before residuary
realty.
At common law all devises of realty were considered
specific due to the fact that after-acquired lands could not
pass under a will, and therefore a residuary devise being
specific would abate proportionally along with other specific
devises.24 However, today in all states a residuary devise
will operate to pass after-acquired lands, 5 therefore a
residuary devise is now considered a general devise that
must abate prior to a specific devise.2 ' This principle is
impliedly recognized in the Act of 1894 by charging all
realty except that specifically devised with the payment
of pecuniary legacies. But as between intestate realty and
residuary realty, the statute is silent as to whether in-
testate realty must be abated first. The case of Mitchell v.
Mitchell,27 in a conflict between the heirs and the specific
devisees, recognized intestate realty as the primary source
for the payment of debts of the estate in the absence of
personalty, and it can likewise be argued that the intestate
realty should also be the primary source in a contest be-
tween the heirs and a residuary devisee. In both situations
the devisees whether specific or residuary have been the
express objects of the testator's bounty, while the heirs
have taken by operation of law merely because the will did
not validly dispose of the entire estate of the testator.
Remember, it will not be possible to have both intestate
realty and residuary realty unless some devise in the will
has failed.28 Should the Court of Appeals be presented with
the situation where both intestate and residuary realty
exist in the same estate, probably the Court would con-
sider the intestate realty the primary source for the pay-
ment of debts in the absence of personalty and abate the
intestate realty in favor of the residuary realty.29
Bristol v. Stump, 136 Md. 236, 110 A. 470 (1920).
Lancefleld v. Iggulden, L. R. 10 Ch. App. 136 (1874).
21 Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills, 14 Iowa L. Rev. 172, 187 (1929).
In re Nelson's Estate, 278 Pa. 416, 123 A. 326 (1924).
221 Md. 244 (1864).
'Disposition of Void and Otherwise Failing Devises in Maryland, 2 Md.
L. Rev. 142 (1938).
' This clearly would be the result under the provisions of the MODEL
PROBATE CODE (1946), §184 (Michigan Legal Studies - Simes).
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5. General Legacies.s0 A general legacy is a legacy pay-
able out of the general assets of the estate and not charged
against a specific chattel or fund. As previously pointed
out, the customary and usual type of general legacy is the
pecuniary legacy. Occasionally courts have construed a
gift of a certain number of shares of stock or a sum of
money in bonds as a general legacy rather than a specific
legacy, where the bequest contained no words describing
the particular stock or bonds other than the corporate
name." In such cases the courts treat the legacy as a
direction to take from general assets either a sufficient
number of shares of such stock or bonds to satisfy the
legacy, or to take money from the general assets sufficient
in amount to buy such stock or bonds at market price.2
Since general legacies are payable out of general assets and
not charged against a specific chattel or fund, the courts
have assumed that a testator would prefer payment of the
specific legacies over the general legacies. Upon this as-
sumption the rule has become firmly established that gen-
eral legacies must abate in favor of specific legacies in the
payment of debts or costs of administration."8 The corollary
of this principle is that the rule that general legacies are
not payable out of chattels or funds that have been specifi-
cally bequeathed by the will but only out of general assets,
and if the general assets are insufficient the general legacies
fail.
Among the general legatees abatement will normally
take place on a pro rata basis, 4 unless a particular general
legacy is entitled to a preference. But certain types of
general legacies have been recognized as being entitled to
a preference over other general legacies. The most im-
portant of these is a general legacy to the widow in lieu of
dower. Since the widow by accepting the general legacy is
waiving her right to dower, she has become a purchaser
of the legacy and should be entitled to preference over all
0 Theoretically a general devise might be found in a will in addition to a
residuary devise. An example of this would be a devise of "40 acres of
land" without any designation of the specific tract, followed by a residuary
devise. However, in practice the only type of general devise found in a will
is the residuary devise. Thus we can classify devises in wills in only two
classes: residuary devises and specific devises.
Dryden v. Owings, 49 Md. 356 (1878).
m Robinson v. Addison, 2 Beav. 515, 48 Eng. Rep. 1281 (1840) ; Mecum v.
Stoughton, 81 N. J. Eq. 319, 86 A. 52 (1913).
81 Negro Cornish v. Willson, 6 Gill 299 (Md., 1848) ; Nash v. Smallwood,
6 Md. 394 (1854).
8, Matthews v. Targarona, 104 Md. 442, 65 A. 60 (1906).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the other general legatees. Several Maryland cases " have
recognized this preference. The question is then raised as
to whether the widow's preference should also apply against
specific legacies as well, on the theory that her right of dower
was prior to the specific legacies and since she is taking the
general legacy in lieu of dower, she should be preferred
over the specific legatees as well. The cases in other juris-
dictions are conflicting, some preferring the widow over
specific legatees,8 and others preferring her only over other
general legatees." Two Maryland cases have considered
this question. In the first case, Mayo v. Bland,5 the Court
held that a general legacy to a widow could only be pre-
ferred over specific legacies in an amount equal to the value
of her common law dower that she had waived, and that
in the absence of proof it would be assumed that the portion
of the general legacy to the widow being abated to pay
debts was in excess of the value of her dower and there-
fore must abate before specific legacies. In the subsequent
case of Addison v. Addison, 9 the Court preferred a pecu-
niary legacy to a widow, in lieu of dower, over both specific
devises and specific legacies, on the theory that by waiving
her common law dower she stood in the position of a credi-
tor and should have priority over all devisees and legatees.
In that case there was no evidence that the amount of the
general pecuniary legacy was grossly in excess of the value
of her common law right of dower. From these cases it
can be deduced that a general legacy to a widow in lieu of
dower is entitled to a preference over specific legacies and
specific devises, where the amount of the legacy is not
grossly disproportionate to the value of the common law
dower that she waived by taking under the will. Whether
the burden of proving the relative values of the general
legacy and the waived dower right rests on the widow as
required in the Mayo case is questionable.
General legacies to creditors are also entitled to a
preference over other general legacies provided the amount
of the legacy is reasonably equivalent to a valid subsisting
debt.4 ° But if the evidence shows that the alleged debt was
actually for gratuitous services rendered the deceased with-
out any expectation of payment, then the general legacy is
Mayo v. Bland, 4 Md. Ch. 484 (1851) ; Durham v. Rhodes, 23 Md. 233
(1865); Addison v. Addison, 44 Md. 182 (1876).
'1Borden v. Jenks, 140 Mass. 562,5 N. E. 623 (1886).
81 Boykin v. Boykin, 21 S. C. (37 Ann. ed.), 513 (1884).
18 Supra, n. 35.
8 Supra, n. 35.40 Matthews v. Targarona, supra, n. 34.
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not entitled to any preference over general legacies to other
volunteers.4
A third type of general legacy that should receive a
preference is one given for the support and maintenance
of minor children of the testator." In such a case the moral
obligation that the parent owes his minor children will
justify the assumption that he intended this general legacy
to be paid irrespective of whether the funds are sufficient
to pay other general legacies. This same principle has been
extended to apply to general legacies for the support of
other near relatives, particularly in cases where a rela-
tionship of dependency exists. The case of Chester Co.
Hospital v. Hayden43 recognized this principle as applicable
to a general legacy for the support of a dependent father.
Where the general legacy for the support of minor children
or dependent relatives is in the form of a trust with only
the income used for this purpose, then the question arises
as to whether the gift of the corpus of the trust should also
be entitled to a preference over other general legacies. If
the legatee receiving the corpus of the trust is not entitled
to a preference in his own right, then clearly the corpus
should abate pro rata with the other general legacies.44
But in the Chester Co. Hospital case, the Court refused to
abate the gift of the corpus along with the other general
legacies on the theory that the testatrix, by setting aside
a trust fund for the support of her dependent father, had
shown an intent to also prefer the gift of the corpus of the
trust at the father's death.
Where several preferred general legacies are found in
the same will, the problem may arise as to which category
of preferred legacies is entitled to preference over other
categories. Although authority is scarce, it seems reason-
able to assume that the order of preference among pre-
ferred general legacies would be as follows: (1) legacies
in lieu of dower, (2) legacies to creditors, and (3) legacies
for support of dependents.45 The order of abatement among
these preferred legacies after abatement of all other gen-
eral legacies would be the inverse of the above.
6. Specific Legacies. The Act of 1785,6 making realty
subject to simple contract debts of the deceased where the
" Ibid.
"Towle v. Swasey, 106 Mass. 100 (1870) ; In re Neil's Estate, 238 N. Y.
138, 144 N. E. 481 (1924).
83 Md. 104, 34 A. 877 (1896).
"In re Cameron's Estate, 278 N. Y. 352, 16 N. E. 2d 362 (1938) ; Towle v.
Swasey, supra, n. 42.
"Comment, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 297, 310 (1937).
"MD. CODE SunP. (1957), Art. 16, §254.
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personalty is found insufficient, clearly recognizes the
primary liability of the personal estate for the payment of
the debts and costs of the administration in the absence of
a contrary intention found in the will. But whether the
presence of both specific devises of realty and specific lega-
cies of personalty in the same will shows a contrary inten-
tion on the part of the testator to charge both his realty
and personalty with the payment of his debts on a pro rata
basis, is a question on which courts have reached conflicting
conclusions. Several recent cases have taken the position
that specific legacies and specific devises should abate pro-
portionally, on the theory that the testator did not intend
to show any preference between specific gifts merely be-
cause he gave one person realty and another personalty.47
In the case of Chase v. Lockerman48 this principle was
applied and both specific devises and specific legacies were
abated proportionally to pay the debts of the estate. How-
ever, the Court carefully limited the application of this
rule to cases involving specialty debts as distinguished from
simple contract debts. Then in the subsequent case of
Dugan v. Hollins" the Court refused to abate the specific
devises proportionally with the specific legacies for the
payment of simple contract debts, holding that a specific
legatee whose chattel was taken to pay simple contract
debts could not obtain contribution from the specific de-
visees but only from the other specific legatees. Finally
in the recent case of Knox v. Stamper ° the Court reviewed
the earlier cases, and after holding that costs of administra-
tion were simple contract debts, held that specific legacies
must abate prior to specific devises in order to pay simple
contract debts of the estate. To the argument that this
defeated the intent of the testator to treat his specific
devisees and legatees equally, the Court said that the law
was well established in Maryland and that any change
would have to be made by legislative action.
The rule that in the case of specialty debts, both specific
devises and specific legacies must abate proportionally had
its most unusual application in the case of Addison v.
Addison.5 In that case the Court held that a general legacy
in lieu of dower was entitled to a preference over both
specific legacies and specific devises because the widow
17Baker v. Baker, 319 Il. 320, 150 N. E. 284 (1925) ; Farnum v. Bascom,
122 Mass. 282 (1877).
'811 G. & J. 185 (Md., 1840).49 11 Md. 41 (1857).
186 Md. 238, 46 A. 2d 361 (1946).
a44 Md. 182 (1876).
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stood in the position of a quasi creditor, and then proceeded
to abate both specific devises and specific legacies on a pro
rata basis on the principle that the testator intended to
treat his specific devisees and legatees equally. Why a
general legacy to a widow in lieu of dower should be
treated as a specialty debt rather than as a simple contract
debt was not explained in the case. Thus only in the cases
of specialty debts and general legacies in lieu of dower,
can the specific devises be abated proportionally with the
specific legacies; and since specialty debts expressly bind-
ing on the testator's heirs have disappeared from business
usages, we can say that specific legacies must abate prior to
specific devises in Maryland.
Among the specific legacies, abatement will ordinarily
be on a pro rata basis.52 But the case of demonstrative
legacies deserves special consideration. A demonstrative
legacy is normally a pecuniary legacy charged against a
specific chattel or fund. If the pecuniary amount is payable
only out of the specific fund or chattel, then it is merely a
specific legacy.53 But if the intent to have the legacy paid
out of general assets, if the specific chattel or fund is in-
sufficient, can be found from the wording of the gift,
then it is described as a demonstrative legacy. In other
words, if the chattel or fund is merely designated as a
primary source for payment, it is demonstrative; but if the
chattel or fund is the sole source of payment, it is specific.
In cases of abatement a demonstrative legacy abates along
with the specific legacies to the extent to which the legacy
does not exceed the amount of the fund or value of the
chattel. 4 But if the pecuniary amount of the legacy is in
excess of the amount of the fund or value of the chattel,
or if the fund is no longer in existence, the excess amount
is treated as a general legacy and must abate with the
general legacies. Where several demonstrative legacies are
payable out of the same fund or chattel, there is a double
aspect to the problem of pro rata abatement: first, there
is the problem of pro rata abatement between the specific
legacies and the demonstrative legacies, and secondly, there
is the problem of abatement among the demonstrative
legatees themselves. As between the specific legacies and
the demonstrative legacies abatment must be proportional,
but among the demonstrative legatees the question arises
as to whether any demonstrative legacy is entitled to a
Sparks v. Weedon, 21 Md. 156 (1864).
"Gelbach v. Shively, 67 Md. 498, 10 A. 247 (1887).
rA Dugan v. Hollins, supra, n. 49; Braden v. Coale, 165 Md. 150, 166 A. 730
(1933).
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preference over the other demonstrative legacies on the
same basis of priority as applied among general legacies.
This question was raised in the case of Matthews v. Tar-
garona" where five demonstrative legacies were charged
against a single specific fund. The Court indicated that the
fact that a specific fund was set aside to pay these five
legacies showed an intention to treat all equally, and that
the very nature of demonstrative legacies as being specific
refuted any intention of the testator to have one preferred
over the others. Therefore demonstrative legacies whether
charged against a single fund or separate funds should
abate among themselves as well as with the specific legacies
purely on a pro rata basis.
7. Specific Devises. This order of abatement leaves
specific devises as the last item in a testator's estate to
abate to pay debts or costs of administration. As pointed
out, only in the case of specialty debts expressly binding
on the heirs and general legacies in lieu of dower, can
specific devises be required to abate proportionally with
the specific legacies. But among themselves specific dev-
isees are required to contribute toward the payment of
debts on a pro rata basis the same as among the specific
legatees.
DEPLETION THE RESULT OF Wmow's RENUNCIATION
In addition to the three situations previously discussed
where the decedent's estate is insufficient to carry out his
testamentary scheme of distribution, a fourth situation
frequently arises from the action of the surviving spouse in
renouncing the will and electing to take as a statutory
heir." This situation differs from the other three in two
respects: first, the assets are still there to carry out the
testator's testamentary scheme, but the surviving spouse
has elected to disregard his desires and to upset his plans;
and secondly, in most cases the surviving spouse by re-
nouncing the will has also renounced a beneficial interest
provided for her in the will, thereby creating undisposed
of property.
When this situation exists, the first question arising is
the effect upon the other dispositions of the surviving
spouse's election to take as a statutory heir.57 The setting
-104 Md. 442,65 A. 60 (1906).
'MD. CODE (1951), Art. 93, §325.
Under the Code, ibid, the surviving spouse may elect to take common
law dower in the realty plus a statutory share In the personalty; but since
a dower interest in realty is only for life while a statutory share is abso-
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up of this statutory share may be handled in one of three
ways: (1) The statutory share may be treated as a debt
of the estate similar to the Federal Estate Tax and the
devises and legacies abated under the established order of
abatement for the payment of debts."8 Under this treatment
the residuary legacy and devise may be exhausted while
the specific legacies and devises are exonerated. (2) The
order of abatement to pay debts may be entirely disre-
garded and all devises and legacies required to contribute
on a pro rata basis.5 9 Under this rule specific legacies and
devises must be abated proportionally with the residuary
legacy and devise. (3) The election to take a statutory
share may be treated as a loss by operation of law falling
upon all the assets of the estate, similar to a fire or act of
God. Under this theory the surviving spouse will take as
a tenant in common in all the specific realty and chattels
and a share of the money.
The earliest Maryland case6" adopted this last theory
of treating the renunciation and election as a loss by opera-
tion of law. Subsequent cases6" took the same position until
the case of Marriott v. Marriott,6 where the Court appeared
to apply the order of abatement rule so that both specific
legacies and pecuniary legacies were exonerated from loss
at the expense of the residuary legatee. However, the effect
of this case is greatly weakened by the fact that in a subse-
quent case63 the Court repeated the rule applied in the
earlier cases without even recognizing the Marriott case as
being inconsistent in language. Under this rule of treating
the renunciation and election as a loss by operation of law,
the surviving spouse takes her statutory share in kind,64
that is, she becomes vested with the legal title to each
specific piece of realty and each specific chattel as a tenant
in common, and in addition takes from the liquid assets
such as money a statutory share. The effect upon specific
legatees and devisees is to make them tenants in common
with the surviving spouse, thus depriving them of the
lute, the usual election will be a statutory share in both realty and per-
sonalty. Only if the estate was subject to large debts, would the surviving
spouse obtain an interest in the realty of greater financial value by electing
to take common law dower.
58 Lewis v. Sedgwick, 223 Ill. 213, 79 N. E. 14 (1906).
51In re Povey's Estate, 271 Mich. 627, 261 N. W. 98 (1935).
0 Darrington v. Rogers, 1 Gill 403 (Md., 1843).61Devecmon v. Kuykendall, 89 Md. 25, 42 A. 963 (1899); Mercantile Trust
Co. v. Schloss, 165 Md. 18, 166 A. 599 (1933).
175 Md. 567,3 A. 2d 493 (1939).
61 Webster v. Scott, 182 Md. 118, 32 A. 2d 475 (1943).
m.Kuykendall v. Devecmon, 78 Md. 537, 28 A. 412 (1894) ; Mercantile Trust
Co. v. Schloss, supra, n. 61.
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priority that their specific devise or bequest would have had
over general legatees and residuary devisees and legatees
in abatement to pay debts." On the other hand, pecuniary
general legacies are payable out of the general assets of
the estate; so if there remains in the residuary portion of
the estate sufficient funds to pay all of these legacies, then
the general legacies are paid in full at the expense of the
residuary legatee or devisee.6 6 Thus, this rule of treating
the surviving spouse's renunciation and election as a loss
by operation of law has the effect of throwing the loss upon
the specific legatees and devisees, along with the residuary
legatee and devisee, while exonerating the general legacies
from the loss, provided the general assets remaining in the
residue are sufficient to satisfy these general legacies in full.
In the usual situation where the surviving spouse re-
nounces the will and elects to take as a statutory heir, there
has been a devise or bequest in the will to such spouse
which is thereby annulled. This raises the problem of the
proper disposition of that portion of the estate which has
been renounced. Of course, an aliquot share of this prop-
erty, as well as all other property of the testator, becomes
part of the surviving spouse's statutory share. But there
may still remain a portion which is not disposed of by the
will. Where a devise or bequest fails, the rule followed
in most states is to treat such property as part of the resi-
due. But, as previously pointed out, in Maryland realty
subject to a void or failing devise passes as intestate
realty,67 while personalty under the same circumstances
will fall into the residuary legacy. Therefore, any realty
renounced by the surviving spouse and not included in her
statutory share should become intestate realty, while per-
sonalty would become part of the residue. However, these
principles are usually found inapplicable because of the
application of the doctrine of acceleration of remainders
and the principle of sequestration. In most wills where
the widow has been dissatisfied with her husband's dis-
position for her benefit and has renounced the will, it has
been because her share had been set up as a trust for life
rather than an absolute interest. Thus, by renouncing the
will she has been able to avoid the trust and obtain an
MDeveemon v. Kuykendall, 8upra, n. 61; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schloss,
supra, n. 61; Webster v. Scott, supra, n. 63.
0Read v. Maryland Gen'l. Hospital, 157 Md. 565, 146 A. 742 (1929). The
same conclusion is implicit In the case of Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schloss,
supra, n. 61.
Disposition of Void and Otherwise Failing Devises in Maryland, 2 Md.
L. Rev. 142 (1938).
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absolute interest. In all such cases we run into the accepted
Maryland rule that renunciation of a life estate is equiva-
lent to death, so as to accelerate the remainderman's in-
terest, provided the remainder is capable of accelaration.65
As contrasted with this doctrine, Maryland also has ac-
cepted the principle that where the renunciation and elec-
tion by the surviving spouse has disarranged the provisions
of the will so as to disappoint the other legatees and dev-
isees, the renounced property should be sequestered and
used to alleviate the loss suffered by the other legatees and
devisees. 9
This conflict between the principle of acceleration of
the remainder, where a life estate has been renounced,
and the equitable principle of sequestration of the re-
nounced interest has caused considerable confusion in the
Maryland cases as well as in other states. The American
Law Institute has attempted to formulate a set of rules to
be applied to determine when sequestration should be
applicable.7" These rules rest upon the hypothesis that if
the surviving spouse's renunciation and election causes
"substantial distortion" among the other testamentary dis-
positions, sequestration should be applied; but if no "sub-
stantial distortion" takes place, then acceleration of the
remainder should normally follow. An examination of the
Maryland cases discloses that sequestration was applied in
several to avoid a "substantial distortion". In Hinkley v.
House of Refuge7 the remainder following the widow's life
estate was to be distributed to the testator's grandchildren
and his sister, but only after payment of large pecuniary
legacies to charities. By the renunciation and election the
corpus of the remainder was reduced one-third in amount,
although the pecuniary legacies were still payable in full.
This resulted in "substantial distortion" between the pecu-
niary legatees and the remaindermen. The Court, there-
fore, to alleviate this loss of one-third of the corpus, seques-
tered the widow's life estate in the two-thirds remaining
and directed that the income for the widow's life be added
to the corpus in order to rebuild that fund before the pecu-
niary legacies became payable. Then in the case of Mer-
"Cockey v. Cockey, 141 Md. 373, 118 A. 850 (1922); Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v.
Gunther, 142 Md. 644, 121 A. 479 (1923).
0Hinkley v. House of Refuge, 40 Md. 461 (1874); Mercantile Trust Co.
v. Schloss, supra, n. 61; Dowell v. Dowell, 177 Md. 370, 9 A. 2d 593 (1939).
'0RESTAT MENT, PROPERTY (1936), §234, and 1948 Supp. 459. See mono-
graph in Appendix: Aspects of the Law of Acceleration and Sequestration,
ibid, Ap. 48.
Supra, n. 69.
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cantile Trust Co. v. Schloss 72 the Court again applied the
sequestration doctrine. There the widow renounced a life
estate and elected to take one-half as statutory heir. This
election operated to take half of a tract of land which was
the subject of a specific devise. Here both the specific
devisee and the remaindermen lost one-half of their dis-
positions, but acceleration would give the remaindermen
the additional sum of the income on the remaining half of
the residue during the widow's lifetime, while the specific
devisee would still lose one-half of the tract of land. Con-
sidering this result a "substantial distortion", the Court
applied the principle of sequestration by reimbursing the
specific devisee for the value of land lost to the widow out
of the corpus of the trust estate remaining and then apply-
ing acceleration for the remaindermen's benefit. The case
of Dowell v. Dowel 7 3 is similar to the Mercantile Trust Co.
case in that specific devisees and legatees lost one-third of
their dispositions by the widow's renunciation and election.
The Court refused to accelerate the remainder following
the widow's renunciation of a life interest in a trust fund,
but sequestered the income during the widow's life to re-
imburse the specific devisees and legatees for their losses.
These cases clearly indicate that where "substantial distor-
tion" results from the renunciation and election or will re-
sult from applying acceleration, the equitable principle of
sequestration will be interposed to alleviate this distortion.
The application of sequestration to a renounced life
estate can be carried out by several legal devices. The one
most commonly used is to continue the trust for the life of
the surviving spouse in the portion not used to satisfy her
statutory share and sequester the income for the benefit of
those legatees and devisees suffering excessive losses. This
was the device used in the Hinkley case and the Dowell
case, and is the machinery recommended in the Restate-
ment of Property.74 Another method of accomplishing
sequestration is to determine the present value of the re-
nounced life estate in the property remaining in the trust,
deduct that from the corpus of the trust, and then accel-
erate the remainder. This was the machinery used in the
Mercantile Trust Co. case where the amount sequestered
was only a small portion of the actual present value of the
renounced life estate. This second method should always
be used where the amount to be sequestered is less than
-' 165 Md. 18, 166 A. 599 (1933).
73 Supra, n. 69.
" Op. cit., 8upra, n. 70, §235, comment a.
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the present value of the renounced life estate, so that
acceleration can be permitted as to the excess valuation.
Also it has the advantage of closing the estate immediately
by terminating a trust whose principal purpose is no longer
possible of accomplishment, namely, keeping the property
from the absolute control of the surviving spouse.
In contrast to the above cases where the principle of
sequestration has been applied so as to reduce the "substan-
tial distortion" caused by the surviving spouse's renuncia-
tion and election, we find several Maryland cases where
sequestration was denied and acceleration of the remainder
took place. Three of these cases can be justified on the
grounds that the renunciation and election did not cause a
"substantial distortion" among the testamentary disposi-
tions and therefore sequestration was not necessary to
effectuate the testator's intent. In Cockey v. Cockey7" the
only question before the Court involved the acceleration of
a vested remainder following the renounced life estate of
the widow. Since this vested remainder was limited to one
child only, with executory devises over to the other chil-
dren in case that child died before the widow, the renuncia-
tion and election caused no distortion among remainder-
men. Acceleration of the remainder had the effect of com-
pensating this sole vested remainderman for loss of one-
third of the corpus. The case does not disclose whether
there were any other dispositions to the other children in.
the will that were distorted by the renunciation and elec-
tion. The case of Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Gunther0 involved
a residuary legacy to the widow for life followed by a re-
mainder to the testator's four children in equal shares.
Renunciation by the widow caused no distortion among
these remaindermen, and acceleration benefited all equally.
The case does disclose other dispositions in the will to these
same four children, but they were minor in amount com-
pared with the residuary estate, and also the dispositions
were relatively equal in value so that the renunciation and
election caused no "substantial distortion" among the
legatees in respect to these other dispositions. Only in the
case of Davis v. Hilliard77 has it been argued that "substan-
tial distortion" resulted from the renunciation of a life in-
terest and election of a statutory share, yet acceleration
was allowed.7" However, a careful examination of the case
"Supra, n. 68.
Supra, n. 68.
129 Md. 348, 99 A. 420 (1916).
78 Op. cit., supra, n. 70. Appendix: Aspects of the Law of Acceleration and
Sequestration, Ap. 69-70, fn. 36, lists this case as contrary to the "substantial
distortion" test.
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discloses no "substantial distortion" resulting from the re-
nunciation and election followed by acceleration of the re-
mainder. The will grouped the objects of the testator's
bounty other than his widow into two classes: first, his
children, and second, his grandchildren. As for his children
he set up life annuities payable out of the income of the
trust, and then provided for equal distribution among his
grandchildren of the corpus at age 30. The widow's re-
nunciation did not affect the children so long as sufficient
assets remained in the trust to pay their life annuities, and
the acceleration of the remainder benefited all the grand-
children equally. So clearly sequestration was entirely un-
necessary as no "substantial distortion" existed.
The only Maryland case denying the doctrine of seques-
tration, where "substantial distortion" resulted from the
widow's renunciation and election, was the case of Darring-
ton v. Rogers,79 the first case in Maryland involving this
conflict between the principle of acceleration and the doc-
trine of sequestration. In that case the testator divided
his entire estate into moieties, one to be held in trust for
the widow during her life with remainder to his children,
and the other moiety in trust for other relatives. The
widow renounced the will and elected to take an absolute
interest in one-third of the estate. The Court upheld the
action of the lower court in deducting the widow's one-
third before dividing the estate into moieties, and in acceler-
ating the moiety to the children. Under this holding the
widow's renunciation resulted in a loss of one-third to both
moieties, so a "substantial distortion" resulted to these
other relatives to whom one-half of the estate had been be-
queathed. The Court treated this loss to these other rela-
tives as one suffered by operation of law, and then acceler-
ated the remainder to the testator's children, so that they
received the remaining two-thirds of their moiety immedi-
ately rather than the entire one-half of the estate at the
widow's death. If the widow had a long life expectancy
then the children gained by her renunciation and the accel-
eration, since two-thirds of the moiety immediately would
be of greater value than the entire moiety at her death.
Here a "substantial distortion" resulted under the rules of
the Restatement of Property, 0 and sequestration of the
widow's renounced life estate in the children's moiety was
in order to alleviate the loss to the other relatives of one-
third of their moiety. It should be noted that this was the
TO 1 Gill 403 (Md., 1843).
80 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936), §234, comment 1.
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first case in Maryland involving this problem, and that the
doctrine of sequestration, as applied in renunciation and
election cases, had not at that time been developed by the
Court of Appeals.
Where acceleration of the remainder is allowed in cases
of renunciation of the life estate, there may arise a ques-
tion as to the effect of acceleration on contingent interests
of third parties in the remainder. This problem arises
where the interest of the remainderman is vested, but not
indefeasibly vested, i.e., vested subject to opening or vested
subject to defeasance. Where the period, during which the
vested remainder is to remain subject to opening or subject
to defeasance, is the period of the renounced life estate,
then the question arises as to whether the renunciation of
the life estate and the acceleration of the remainder cut off
these contingent interests as effectively as if the life tenant
had in fact died. This question has been considered in
several Maryland cases,"1 and in each instance the Court
held that the act of renunciation was equivalent to death
so that the acceleration of the remainder had the same
effect as if the life tenant had in fact died. Thus, any con-
tingent future interests, that were contingent upon events
to occur during the life estate, were effectively cut off. This
rule is justified on the theory that the testator only in-
tended the remainderman's interest to remain subject to
opening or defeasance while he was out of possession, and
that when his possession commenced, whether through
death of the life tenant or by renunciation, the testator in-
tended the possession of the remainderman to be absolute
and indefeasibly vested from then on.
In all of the cases discussed above, the renounced dis-
position of the surviving spouse was a life interest, and
therefore the problem of sequestration was intermingled
with the problem of acceleration of the remainder. Where
the renounced disposition is an absolute interest rather
than a life estate, then the sole problem is whether to
apply the doctrine of sequestration so as to avoid a "sub-
stantial distortion" or allow the renounced property to fall
into the residuary clause or pass as intestate property. In
the case of Kuykendall v. Devecmon" the widow renounced
certain specific devises and legacies as well as a one-third
interest in the residue and elected to take one-third of the
entire estate. She was awarded a one-third interest in kind
4 Randall v. Randall, 85 Md. 430, 37 A. 209 (1897) ; Cockey v. Cockey, 141
Md. 873, 118 A. 850 (1922).
"78 Md. 537, 28 A. 412 (1894). See also the sequel in Deveemon v. Kuy-
kendall, 89 Md. 25, 42 A. 963 (1899).
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in all devises and legacies, including a one-third interest in
a specific devise of realty to a nephew. The Court refused
to sequester the renounced dispositions so as to alleviate
the loss to the nephew, but held that the renounced disposi-
tions passed as part of the residuary clause. A "substantial
distortion" certainly resulted to the nephew, but the Court
repudiated the sequestration doctrine with the argument
that the widow's act of renunciation defeated the testator's
plan, and any property renounced must be treated as either
part of the residue or as intestate property. The only justi-
fication for this decision lies in the fact that the resulting
"substantial distortion" was in favor of the testator's only
child, the natural object of his bounty. Likewise, in the
case of Webster v. Scott83 a "substantial distortion" resulted
from the husband's renunciation of the testatrix's will
which provided for a pecuniary general legacy to the hus-
band, yet the Court failed to sequester this renounced pecu-
niary legacy to alleviate the loss suffered by a specific dev-
isee and legatee. It should be noted that the reason given
for failing to sequester this pecuniary legacy was the fact
that there were no assets in the residue to pay this re-
nounced general legacy, because other general legacies
exceeded the total general assets of the estate. The Court
failed to realize that this renounced general legacy to the
husband could have been considered as being entitled to
a pro rata share of the general assets along with the other
general legacies, and therefore to that extent it could have
been sequestered to reimburse the specific, devisee and
legatee for his loss from the renunciation.
On the whole, it appears from the decided cases that the
Court of Appeals recognizes the equity of the sequestra-
tion doctrine where a "substantial distortion" of the testa-
tor's plan of distribution has arisen through the renuncia-
tion and election of the surviving spouse. Where there are
no assets available in the renounced disposition, then the
doctrine can not be applied; but where such assets are
available, they should be sequestered to reimburse the
specific devisees and legatees for their losses. If no "sub-
stantial distortion" resulted, then sequestration is not
needed; but where "substantial distortion" is recognized,
the doctrine will usually be applied to re-establish the test-
ator's plan. The failure of the Court to apply sequestration
in a few of these latter cases has resulted from the failure
of counsel to properly argue the issue. With the aid of the
8'182 Md. 118, 32 A. 2d 475 (1943).
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rules set out in the Restatement of Property, 4 it is believed
that in the future the Court of Appeals will apply the
doctrine of sequestration in all cases where a "substantial
distortion" has resulted from the renunciation and elec-
tion of the surviving spouse, whether the renounced in-
terest is an absolute estate or a life interest.
CONCLUSION
In the case of abatement of legacies and devises to pay
debts and costs of administration, the present Maryland
order of abatement probably effectuates the testator's in-
tent in most instances. A testator usually contemplates the
possibility of debts; and when he makes a specific devise
or bequest, he probably contemplates a priority in its satis-
faction; and likewise, when he devises or bequeaths the
residue of his estate, he is probably contemplating the pay-
ment of debts and costs from this residue. But where a
testator makes specific devises of realty and specific be-
quests of personalty, there is little justification for the rule
that abates the specific legacies before abating the specific
devises. The average testator in such a circumstance prob-
ably desires his specific devisees and legatees to be treated
equally. The same can probably be said of a testator who
inserts separate clauses disposing of his residuary realty
and his residuary personalty to different persons. He prob-
ably doesn't contemplate the exhaustion of his residuary
personalty in paying debts to the exoneration of his resi-
duary realty. A more realistic interpretation of the testa-
tor's intent would result if the act of 17855 were amended to
make real property of a decedent subject to the claims of
all types of creditors on the same basis as personal property,
where such real property is disposed of by the terms of a
will. Such an amendment would adopt the modern order
of abatement making specific devises and specific legacies
abate on a pro rata basis, thus effectuating the desires of
the average testator. Also it would make a separate resi-
duary devise abate with the residuary legacy on a pro
rata basis.
On the other hand, the depletion of the testator's estate
by the renunciation and election of the surviving spouse
was probably not contemplated by the testator, so there is
little justification for applying the order of abatement as
in the payment of debts. The Maryland rule of treating
Op. cit., supra, n. 80, §234, and 1948 Supp. 459.
8 Mp. CODE SuPP. (1957), Art. 16, §254.
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this as a loss by operation of law is simple of operation, but
its application may result in a "substantial distortion" of
the testator's scheme of distribution. If equity will exer-
cise its power of sequestration over the renounced interest,
this distortion can be greatly reduced. Great flexibility
exists in the equity court under this doctrine, but this is
probably more desirable than the arbitrary application of
the Maryland order of abatement to these cases. It should
be noticed that the application of the doctrine of sequestra-
tion, whereby the specific legatees and devisees are reim-
bursed for their losses, tends to reach the same result that
would be reached if the Maryland order of abatement had
been applied. However, the very fact that flexibility exists
permits the equity court to exercise its discretion in apply-
ing sequestration both as to amount and procedure. Thus,
the testator's plan of distribution can be carried out on a
modified scale with little distortion between the types of
legacies and devises.
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PROBATION IN TE CRIMINAL COURT
OF BALTIMORE CITY
By H. B. Mu-rrE*
Probation is an outgrowth of the common-law practice
of the suspended sentence which, in turn, probably had its
origin in some ancient and medieval practice of amnesty
or grace; e.g., "benefit of clergy", "right of sanctuary", and
"judicial reprieve".1 The institution of probation in our
modern system of criminal jurisprudence implements our
present day theory of correction. Management of a crimi-
nal has always posed a dilemma in regard to the ultimate
end to be accomplished. "Correction" has taken on many
motives throughout history, but it suffices to say that our
present day thinking on the subject puts new emphasis on
the redemption of the individual.2 Underneath it all,
society will eventually be the real beneficiary if the in-
dividual is benefited so that he becomes a useful member
of society rather than an habitual criminal.8 Probation
plays a most important role in the field of crime control and
correction, and it can be said that probation is a non-puni-
tive method of treating criminal offenders within the frame-
work of a system, which, in general, is punitive.4 Statutory
authorization for probation is a departure from strict ad-
herence to law, since constitutionally, there is no right to
probation, and a prisoner cannot insist on terms or strike a
bargain.5 The granting of probation, aside from being an
act of clemency extended to one who has committed a
crime, is also in substance and effect a bargain made by
the people, through legislation and courts, with the male-
factor.6 A broader definition of probation might be stated
as follows:
"Probation is the status of a convicted offender dur-
ing a period of suspension of the sentence in which he
is given liberty conditioned on his good behavior and in
*Probation Officer of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City; B.S.,
University of Maryland, 1953; LL.B., University of Maryland, School of
Law, 1957.1BARNms AND TmNs, NEw HoRizoNs IN CIMINOLOGY (1951), 758-775.
Also see ATroaNEY GENRAL'S SUnvEX OF RzrfA.sE PaocnuRas (1939),
Volume 2, Ch. I.
'See TAPPAN, CONTEMPORARY CORamcON (1951 ed.), 3-17; see also
STRAHORN, PaORATIoN, PAROLE, AND LGAL RuLES OF GUILT, 26 J. Cr. Law
and Cr. (1935) 168.
'People v. Molz, 415 Ill. 183, 113 N. E. 2d 314 (1953).
' SUTHERLAND, PaRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY (4th ed.), 381-411.
Supra, n. 3.
0 People v. Johnson, 134 Cal. App. 2d 140, 285 P. 2d 74 (1955).
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which the state by personal supervision attempts to
assist him to maintain good behavior",7
or:
"[Probation is] to provide an individualized pro-
gram offering a young or unhardened offender an
opportunity to rehabilitate himself without institu-
tional confinement under the tutelage of a probation
official and under the continuing power of the Court
to impose institutional punishment for his original
offense in the event that he abuse this opportunity."'
The terms probation and parole, although dealing in the
same area, are not one and the same. There exists an im-
portant and definite distinction between the two, in that
probation is afforded to an individual without his having
to suffer incarceration, and parole is afforded to an in-
dividual who has suffered a period of incarceration; the
former is a judicial power while the latter is an executive
or administrative power. Both, however, are intended to
be a means of restoring offenders who are good social risks
to society and to afford the unfortunate another opportunity
by clemency."0
The first probation law in this country was passed in
Massachusetts in 1878, but the practice of probation was
carried on informally much earlier. It is noted that as early
as 1831, a member of the Boston judiciary, Judge Peter 0.
Thatcher, placed young offenders under supervision with-
out incarceration. But perhaps probation as we know it
can probably be attributed to John Augustus, a shoemaker
in Boston who informally began probationary services."
Many other states soon followed the New England begin-
ning and passed similar statutes. Maryland became the
second state to adopt the principle and philosophy of pro-
bation. 2 In 1894, the Maryland legislature passed an act
authorizing the Criminal Courts of the state to suspend
sentence and release offenders upon such terms as the Court
might deem proper."3 This act, however, created no pro-
bation department to oversee supervision of released
offenders. Hence, judges were compelled to impose upon
7 Supra, n. 4.8 Roberts v. United States, 320 U. S. 264, 272 (1943). Parenthetical ma-
terial supplied.
9 See Strahorn, 8upra, n. 2.1 0 Korematsu v. United States, 319 U. S. 432 (1943).
Op. cit, 8upra, n. 1.
Stuckert, Report of the Probation Department of the Supreme Bench
for the Decade: 1929-1938.
Ch. 402, Acts of 1894.
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the hospitality and good offices of the Prisoners Aid Asso-
ciation to supervise the conduct of persons released on pro-
bation. However, in 1931, the Supreme Bench of Baltimore
City recommended legislation to establish a probation de-
partment under the management of and responsible to the
Supreme Bench; the recommended legislation was adopted
by the passage of Chapter 132, Acts of 1931.11 Authoriza-
tion for the Probation Department of the Supreme Bench
of Baltimore City can presently be found in the Charter &
Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (Flack, 1949), Sec-
tions 276-288. The department, headed by a Director of
Probation, is administratively divided into two parts, con-
sisting of the Domestic Relations Division - dealing with
cases of non-support, bastardy, alimony, and the like, and
the Criminal Division - dealing with general criminal
cases in the narrow sense. This article is limited to a dis-
cussion of that latter division.
The Criminal Division of the Probation Department of
the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City provides services
for investigation and supervision of offenders appearing in
the three parts of the Criminal Court of Baltimore City,
with special emphasis on the Youth Court (Part III).
Presently, the personnel of the Criminal Division consists
of two court representatives, present throughout all Youth
Court sessions, six investigating officers, and nine super-
vising officers, with offices located in the Baltimore City
Court House. The staff of the department is appointed by
the Supreme Bench, being selected after competitive
examination.
Investigation, an essential and important function of any
probation department, provides background material from
which the judiciary may gain insight and better under-
standing of a criminal case, so as to permit "justice" under
the circumstances. Embodied in all investigation reports
is certain basic background data: e.g., family history, em-
ployment record, educational achievements, previous crimi-
nal record, etc. The report also contains, as well as a narra-
tive summary of the background data, circumstances of the
instant offense and individual observations, concluding in
a recommendation or suggestion as formulated by the in-
vestigating officer. 15 Very often, in conjunction with pro-
bation investigations, the Medical Department of the
Supreme Bench will submit psychiatric or general reports,
"Report of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City for the year ending
January, 1931.
15 ATroRNzY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF REILEASE PROCEDURES (1939), Chs. V
and VI.
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thus making more technical information available to the
Court. Needless to say, this added service to the Court is
of utmost importance, and rounds out the scope of investi-
gatorial services.
Investigations are made only at the discretion of the
Court and are not binding as to the judgment in a particular
case.16 Formal written investigations are essentially divided
into three types: Pre-Trial, Pre-sentence, and Post Sen-
tence. It should be noted that the Pre-Trial Investigation
is limited in use and only recommended in special circum-
stances; 7 e.g., where agreement is made between defense
counsel and the Court that a plea of guilty will be forth-
coming; the basic reason, among others, for such limited
use should be clear, for under our principles of criminal
jurisprudence, the facts incidental to the commission of a
crime have no bearing on the finding of a verdict. In some
instances, investigations are done orally where the Court
is desirous of a speedy disposition, and in such situations,
the Court representatives of the probation department
make an "on the spot" investigation, usually, the same day
of the trial. This latter type of inquiry is necessarily quite
limited in scope. From time to time, the Court may require
information concerning some specific facts; e.g., a proba-
tion officer may be directed to investigate and report on the
physical conditions of an area where an alleged crime has
occurred.
To assist in the investigation of criminal cases, officers
undertaking this duty can utilize legal processes, such as
the subpoena duces tecum, to aid them in procuring in-
formation from sometimes reluctant sources. Completed
investigations and, as a matter of fact, all information and
records of the probation department, are given quasi-
judicial protection by way of privilege."5
6 People v. Molz, 415 Ill. 183, 113 N. H. 2d 314 (1953).
" In 1956, 12 Pre-Trial Investigations were made as compared to 340 Pre-
Sentence Investigations and 55 Post Sentence Investigations.
§281 of the CHARnm AND P. L. L. oF BALTIMomn CiTy (Flack, 1949), pro-
vides in part that:
"All information and data obtained in the discharge of official duty
by any probation worker or appointee of the Supreme Bench serving
in the Probation Department, from whatsoever source the same shall
be obtained shall be privileged information and shall not be receivable
as evidence in a tribunal or court... and shall not be disclosed directly
or indirectly outside the membership of the Probation Department in
the discharge of his official duties to any one other than to a member
or members of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, unless and until
otherwise ordered by the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City or by any
member thereof."
It is the general opinion of members of the Supreme Bench that informa-
tion in the possession of the probation department should not be used in
any collateral issue.
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The question of "Due Process of Law" in reference to
probation investigation has often arisen,"9 but probably the
Supreme Court of the United States has cleared up this
problem to a large extent by holding, in recent litigation,
that a conviction is not void under the "Due Process" clause
solely by reason of the fact that the Court before imposing
sentence had considered additional information obtained
through the Court's probation department and through
other sources.2  Justice Black, speaking for the majority,
stated that under the practice of individualizing punish-
ments investigational techniques have been given an im-
portant role. Probation workers making reports of their
investigation have not been trained to prosecute but to aid
offenders. Their reports have been given a high value by
conscientious judges who want to sentence persons on the
best available information rather than on guess work and
inadequate information. Justice Murphy, in the dissent,
held that the lower court's decision had deprived a man of
life in reliance on material made available to it on proba-
tion reports consisting almost entirely of evidence that
would have been inadmissible at the trial - irrelevant
facts, records of other crimes, and hearsay evidence,
none of which had been subject to the scrutiny of the de-
fendant. Authority also has it, that where the judge pro-
ceeds to fix a sentence in a criminal case, after a plea of
guilty or verdict of guilty, his inquiry is not limited by the
rules applicable to a jury trial, and he may consider cir-
cumstances that should effect a mitigation or aggravation
of the penalty.2 '
The Maryland Court of Appeals has also ruled recently
in this area and has held that after a conviction, the Court
could exercise a broad discretion in the use of evidence to
assist it in determining the kind and extent of punishment
to impose within the limits fixed by law. Before imposing
a sentence, a judge may consider information concerning
a person's reputation, past offenses, health, habits, mental
and moral propensities, social background, and any other
matters that a judge ought to have before him in determin-
ing the kind of sentence that should be imposed. Also,
information, which might influence the Court's judg-
ment, obtained in a pre-sentence investigation but not re-
ceived from the defendant himself or not given in his
"1 See Rubin, Probation d Due Procem, Focus Magazine, Vol. 31, No. 2
(1952).
21 Williams v. New York, 837 U. S. 241 (1949).
21 WiaMos ON EVIDNCm (3rd ed.) 25, §4(8).
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presence should be called to the accused's attention or to
the attention of his counsel so that he may be afforded an
opportunity to refute or discredit it. The procedure in the
sentencing process is not the same as that in the trial process
and the sentencing judge may consider information even
though obtained outside the courtroom from persons whom
the defendant has not been permitted to confront or cross
examine.2 The Judges of the Baltimore City Criminal
Court have made it a practice to make available to defense
counsel investigation reports, although no copy is given.
The Baltimore City Criminal Court besides having the
right to suspend a sentence generally, provides for proba-
tion under the following terms: probation before conviction
(similar to probation without verdict),23 conditional sus-
pension of sentence, and probation in the ordinary sense.
Probation before conviction is a relatively recent innova-
tion intended to bring legal and social philosophy closer
together in the area of rehabilitation of criminal offenders.
The practice has been to provide the aforementioned type
of probation to individuals whom the Court feels are de-
serving of some protection from the stigma of a criminal
record. However, in receiving this probation, the indi-
vidual "consents" to abide by such conditions as those im-
posed in probation in the ordinary course."' It is important
to note that probation before conviction is not intended to
be a compromise verdict.
The conditional suspension of sentence is utilized where
no supervision per se is ordered other than the "super-
vised" collection of some financial obligation: e.g., a fine,
court costs, restitution, etc. 5 The manner of payment may
be specifically set out in the order or left to the sound judg-
ment of the probation department subject to judicial ap-
proval. It might be added that the probation department
has an extensive collection and accounting department to
facilitate such matters. The order conditionally suspending
the sentence contains also the general proviso requiring of
the defendant "good behavior". This is distinguished from
what might be determined the ordinary rules of probation,
where acts less than a conviction of a subsequent offense
can amount to a violation of probation, while evidently, it
2Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 92 A. 2d 570 (1952). The Court was con-
cerned with a Pre-Sentence Medical Report, but the implication would
appear to be the same for Pre-Sentence Probation Reports.
"Supra, n. 18, §277.
24 Ibid.
2The conditional suspension of sentence can be provided for other pur-
poses; e.g., exile requirements, but they would not fall within the purview
of the Jurisdiction of the probation department.
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would appear, only a subsequent offense could breach the
"good behavior" clause.20
Probation in the ordinary sense, as distinguished from
probation before conviction, is received by an offender after
a verdict or plea of guilty has been entered, and the im-
position of sentence is suspended. The defendant is there-
after placed in the custody of the probation department for
supervision during the term specified. There apparently
exists no right to place a defendant under an order of an
indefinite period of probation,27 and in conformity with this
rule, Section 279 of the Charter and Public Local Laws of
Baltimore City (Flack, 1949), provides that the period of pro-
bation shall not exceed the maximum sentence of imprison-
ment to which such person may be sentenced on any count
of the indictment or charge with which he stands accused,
or, in any case, the period of probation shall not exceed five
years. Extensions of the original period of probation, also
authorized by the aforementioned statute, may be accom-
plished by petitioning for such extension, with the reasons
therefore set out in the petition. The practice for securing
such an extension has been by the submission of a petition
to the Court by a probation officer without requiring the
appearance of the defendant. Some comment has been
made that the defendant should be allowed to appear and
represent his position on such an extension. But, in most
instances, the extensions are applied for in behalf of the
defendants; e.g., to provide for further time to enable com-
pliance with an order requiring payment by way of restitu-
tion. However, the noted comment might be applicable
where the extension is sought counter to the defendant's
wishes.2"
The next question that presents itself concerns the
period within which a Court may suspend a sentence and
place a defendant on probation. In 1942, Judge Eugene
O'Dunne wrote an extensive opinion, in the case of State v.
See State v. Hardin, 183 N. C. 815, 112 S. E. 593 (1922), and cited in
State v. Millner, 240 N. C. 602, 83 S. E. 2d 546 (1954).1 See Horton v. United States, 151 F. 2d 406 (5th Cir., 1945).
U §278 of the CHARTER & P. L. L. or BALTIMORE CITY, supra, n. 18, provides
that after notice to the probationer and the full opportunity to be heard,
the Court may alter, enlarge, modify or change any condition of suspension
of sentence or probation. §279 of the same act provides that the Court,
from time to time may continue to extend the period of probation and
suspension of sentence. This latter section makes no mention of the right
to notice and a hearing when probation is extended.
However, from the reasoning in the case of Palumbo v. Pepersack, The
Daily Record, Jan. 7, 1957, it could be implied that §278 is broad enough
to provide authorization for notice and hearing upon application for a
change in the original order of probation.
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Pettis and Smith,29 in justification of his reduction of a sen-
tence after the term of Court in which such sentence had
been rendered had expired. Eight years later, however,
the Court of Appeals in Czaplinski v. Warden,"° ruling on
this problem, held that the power of a criminal court to
modify its sentence expires at the end of the term of court
in which rendered. In dictum, it was inferred that an at-
tempt to modify a sentence after the term of court had
expired would be an invasion of the parole power of the
Executive.3 As a result of this decision, the Maryland legis-
lature in 1951 passed a law (Sec. 277) providing that the
judges in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City may at any
time before the expiration of sentence suspend such sen-
tence and provide for probation. 2 A rule was proposed to
the Court of Appeals in the same year and provided that
a criminal sentence may be reduced within thirty days
(changed to ninety days in 1952) after the sentence was
imposed, but [by Sec. (d)] that such rule should not limit
the power of the Criminal Court of Baltimore under Section
277 as amended by the Laws of 1951.18 However, in adopting
this rule, the Court of Appeals left out Section (d). 1 Even
in the absence of the deleted provision, however, in accord-
ance with generally accepted rules of construction, by hold-
ing that a suspension of sentence is not a reduction thereof,
the two may be resolved to be not in conflict.
The problem then arises as to whether section 277 of the
Charter and Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (Flack,
1949), as amended by Chapter 529 of the laws of 1951, is
The Daily Record, May 26, 1942.
196 Md. 654, 75 A. 2d 766 (1950).
InFederal authority also has it that after a sentence has been imposed and
a defendant has begun serving his sentence, he is under the control of the
executive branch of the government and the judicial branch should there-
after not attempt to exercise power properly exercised by the parole board.
Mann v. United States, 218 F. 2d 936 (4th Cir., 1955).
2MD. LAWS 1951, Ch. 529, amending §277. The preamble to this statute
stated as follows:
"WHERm.s, the Court of Appeals of Maryland recently held in the
case of State ex rel. Czaplinski v. Warden, 75 A. (2) 766, that the
power of a Criminal Court to modify sentence in criminal cases expires
with the end of the term of court in which rendered, and the decision
has cast doubt upon the authority of the Criminal Court of Baltimore
City to suspend sentence and grant probation to offenders after the
lapse of the term, and
"WH EAS, it is desirable in the opinion of the legislature that the
Judges of the Criminal Court of Baltimore shall have the power and
authority . . ."
8See, Seventh Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, June 12, 1951, and
draft of Rule thereto attached.
,1 The Daily Record, July 2, 1952, now Maryland Rules of Procedure
(1956), Rule 744(c).
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violative of the principle of separation of powers, in light
of the dictum in Czaplinski v. Warden.8 5 In view of section
60 of Article III of the Maryland Constitution, the answer
would appear to be in the negative.8
The general rules governing the conduct of offenders
placed on probation are of standard form as decided upon
by the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City and are as follows:
1. The defendant shall report to his probation officer
as directed.
2. The defendant shall not leave the City of Baltimore
without consent of the Court, nor change his ad-
dress within the city without first obtaining the ap-
proval of his probation officer.
3. The defendant shall maintain regular employment
and (when applicable) adequately support his de-
pendents.
4. The defendant shall conduct himself in a law-abid-
ing manner and shall avoid places and associations
of an undesirable character.
5. The defendant shall report in response to any
notice served upon him by the probation depart-
ment or the police department.
6. The defendant shall make the following payments
(when applicable) ."
In addition to the above-stated general conditions, the
Court has the authority to provide for additional require-
ments where and when necessary; e.g., abstinence from
alcohol, psychiatric treatment, etc.8" The Court may also
alter, modify, or change any condition of the suspended
sentence or probation during the course of supervision. 9
A criminal offender is not entitled to release on proba-
tion as a matter of right but such decision rests in the
1 Supra, n. 30, 664.
The constitutional provision is as follows:
"The General Assembly of Maryland shall have the power to provide
by suitable general enactment (a) for the suspension of sentence by
the Court in criminal cases; (b) for any form of the indeterminate
sentence in criminal cases, and (c) for 'the release upon parole in what-
ever manner the General Assembly may prescribe, of convicts im-
prisoned under sentence of crimes."
A fine, court costs, and restitution are examples of financial obligations
collectible under the probation order.
CHARTn AND P. L. L. op BALTiRmo CiTy (Flack, 1949), §277.
lbid, §278.
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sound discretion of the Court,4" and refusal to suspend a
sentence is not reviewable except in the case of arbitrary
abuse of discretion.4 The Court in granting probation seeks
to provide a deserving individual with another opportunity
to adjust in his community, which is afforded with assist-
ance through supervision. Suspension of sentence without
supervision, from the theoretical point of view, is not pro-
bation.42 The supervision of a probationer is delegated to
a probation officer, whose responsibility it becomes to aid
the offender while seeing that the conditions of probation
are fulfilled.' This is indeed a difficult and sometimes ex-
acting task, requiring sufficient training and experience
plus human understanding and tact. A probation officer
may be called upon to assist, advise, or solve problems in a
multitude of areas; e.g., domestic problems, financial crises,
employment and educational problems, etc. He, the proba-
tion officer, generally follows a course of supervision best
suited to individual circumstances. The expression of the
Supreme Court of the United States that probation officers
have not been trained to prosecute but to aid offenders," is
recognition from the highest court of the land of the task
predominant in the minds of these officers. But, this pre-
dominant task must sometime give way to a further re-
sponsibility; i.e., protection of the community. By and
large, a sufficient number of individuals profit from proba-
tion, and from a community's point of view, probation has
paid for itself. There are those, however, who cannot adjust
even with the opportunity of probation, and they must be
proceeded against to protect the community.45 It is on such
an occasion that the probation officer must act as a "police
agency" for the Court.
The Court, on written charges preferred under oath, of
violation of any conditions of probation, may issue a war-
rant or notice requiring the traverser, probationer, or per-
son accused to be brought before, or appear before said
court, to answer such charges of violation.", Strikingly
enough, there is a conflict among jurisdictions as to whether
there exists a constitutional right to notice and hearing
'*People v. Marks, 340 Mich. 495, 65 N. W. 2d 698 (1954), and State ex
rel. Stauffer v. Wright, 192 Md. 715, 64 A. 2d 125 (1949).
1 Mann v. United States, supra, n. 31.
12 SUTHx.&1D, PmlNcrPLrs or CwImINOLOGY (4th ed.) 381-411.
" In 1956, 1,257 cases were under supervision and of this figure 700 were
new cases received in that year. The 700 new cases were divided as follows:
355 Youths and 345 Adults.
"Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 249 (1949).
5 In 1956, 83 bench warrants were issued, while 225 police notices were
issued.
10 Supra, n. 38, 1279.
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preceding revocation of probation or parole.4 7 Justice
Cardozo, speaking for the majority in Escoe v. Zerbst,4s
expressly rejected the contention that such a privilege has
a basis in the Constitution, apart from any statute.
Also, the question of constitutional right to a hearing
has had an uncertain course in Maryland. The Court of
Appeals, in dealing with Wright v. Herzog,49 stated that no
right to a hearing existed under the statute or the state
constitution, unless demanded by due process of law, and
held that absent any allegation or showing of arbitrary
action by the Governor (the parolee did not deny his viola-
tions) no constitutional violation existed. The Court indi-
cated that arbitrary action, without hearing, could be chal-
lenged by habeas corpus upon allegation and proof of arbi-
trary and capricious action. Thereafter, in Murray v. Swen-
son,50 the Court ruled that a defendant in a revocation of
parole (and by implication, probation) proceeding must
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself,
and in Swan v. State and Hite v. State,5 the Court has
flatly stated that a hearing is a requisite of "due process of
law". In a very recent nisi prius case,52 Judge Michael J.
Manley cited the annotation in 29 A. L. R. 2d 1074 at 1124
as stating that Maryland cases, "are in direct conflict in
principle, as a result of the Court's failure in the Swenson
case to distinguish between 'procedural' and 'substantive'
due process".
It is possible that some of the difficulty is encountered
because of the tendency to follow the traditional approach
of revocation of license proceedings that no hearing is re-
quired for revocation of a "privilege" but is if a "right" is
involved,53 and at least an early tendency to think of con-
ditional pardons, paroles, and probation as constituting only
"privileges".54 Actually, attempting to categorize between
"rights" and "privileges" doesn't help unless it is ap-
proached from the two-fold angle of: (1) Is the claimed
right or privilege of such personal or monetary value to
the individual that fundamental requisites of fair play re-
4729 A. L. R. (2d) 1074-1140.
"295 U. S. 490 (1935).
"182 Md. 316, 34 A. 2d 460 (1943).
50196 Md. 222, 76 A. 2d 150 (1950).
200 Md. 420, 90 A. 2d 690 (1952) ; 198 Md. 602, 84 A. 2d 899 (1951).
2Palumbo v. Pepersack, The Daily Record, Jan. 7, 1957. The case arose
under a habeas corpus proceeding for the denial of the parole board to
allow the petitioner to be represented by counsel at a parole revocation
hearing. Judge Manley held for the petitioner.
m DAVIs, ADMINIsTRAIvE LAW (1951) 246-254.
"Ibid, 249, Wright v. Herzog, supra, n. 49.
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quire that it be not forfeited without a hearing (in which
case it should be a "right") and (2) Should the scope of the
hearing extend to all matters of law and of fact or only
those matters which a trial type hearing may be particu-
larly helpful in solving?55 The Maryland Courts in the area
of pardons, parole, and probation, would seem to have got-
ten the desirable result of requiring a hearing on the fact
of breach of condition before revocation. This result can
be supported most clearly and simply by reasoning which
directly recognizes that whether labeled "rights" or "privi-
leges" these several means of seeking to rehabilitate crimi-
nals involve vital interests of the criminal in every case,
which should not be destroyed without affording the person
involved the opportunity of a hearing, and that like all
rights of substance they are entitled to constitutional pro-
tections as to fair hearing before forfeiture.
The practice in Baltimore City in revocation of proba-
tion proceedings has been to provide notice and hearing
with the "right" to be represented by counsel. Judge
Manley, in his opinion in the Palumbo case,56 notes, as
follows:
".... that in order to alter or modify or add to the
conditions of probation, the probationer must be given
an opportunity to be heard either in person or by coun-
sel. There is no provision in Section 279 relating to
the revocation of probation that specifically gives the
probationer the right to have counsel, but it would
hardly be contended by anyone that the probationer
would not have such right even though none is pro-
vided for in the statute, and even though such a judicial
proceeding is technically not a criminal prosecution."
Generally, in revocation proceedings in Baltimore City,
notice is given by way of summons served by the Police
Department, and these proceedings are commonly referred
to as "Police Notice Hearings". Bench Warrants are issued
where it is deemed necessary to retain a defendant in cus-
tody, prior to a hearing.57 Although a defendant, in revoca-
tion proceedings, must be afforded a reasonable oppor-
tunity to defend himself against the charge that he has
s Ibid. And see particularly, Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So. 2d 607,
609 (1947) ; Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F. 2d 982, 132 A. L. R. 1241 (6th
Cir., 1941). Also see, Weihofen, Revoking Probation, Parole or Pardon
Without Hearing, 32 J. Crim. Law & Crim. 531, 532 (1942).
wfSupra, n. 52.
'Where the circumstances require it, there is authority for allowing the
retention and custody of a probationer prior 'to the issuance of a warrant.
See Ex parte Longoria, 161 Tex. Cr. Rep. 142, 275 S. W. 2d 810 (1955).
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violated his conditions of probation, he is not entitled to a
trial in any strict or formal sense.58 Such hearings are
usually held before the presiding judge of Part III of the
Criminal Court of Baltimore, and one day each week has
been set aside for these proceedings, taking place before
the regular assignment.59 The manner and form of the pro-
ceedings for revocation of probation have been either
formal or informal, at the discretion of the trial judge.60
The issue of whether a defendant has the "right" to be
represented by his own counsel has heretofore been con-
sidered; whether or not a defendant is entitled to counsel
at the expense of the state is another problem. The answer
to this would appear to be dependent upon what standards
must be met in order to satisfy the substantive require-
ments of "due process of law"."
The rules of evidence in the aforementioned proceedings
would appear not subject to the formal regulations re-
quired in the trial of a criminal offense, and this proposi-
tion can be supported by implication from the decisions in
Williams v. New York62 and Driver v. State,6 3 but, having
the right to weigh any testimony, the Court still has a duty
to preserve and protect the basic rights of an individual.
The evidence presented need not establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt as in criminal offenses, but all that is re-
quired is that the evidence be such as to reasonably satisfy
the judge that the conduct of the probationer has not mea-
sured up to the standards required by the conditions of
probation. 4
Testimony is begun by the presentation of the probation
officer's report, and thereafter may be followed by the testi-
mony of witnesses called to support the probation officer's
evidence. The defendant is given the opportunity to cross
" Murray v. Swenson, 8upra, n. 50, 231, and Jett v. Superintendent, 209
Md. 633, 640, 120 A. 2d 580 (1956).
60However, probation can be revoked by any judge assigned to the
Criminal Court of Baltimore. CHARTE & P. L. L. or BAL TIomR Ciry
(Flack, 1949), §280.
, See Murray v. Swenson, aupra, n. 50, and People v. Molz, 415 Ill. 183,
113 N. R. 2d 314 (1953), to the effect that mere informalities or irregulari-
ties in the proceedings which do not prejudice the defendant in any manner
may be disregarded.
a Counsel was appointed in a case where the defendant claimed a mental
defect and there existed evidence thereof. The defendant had previously
been released from custody after a hearing of a habeas corpus petition,
alleging an unfair trial for not being represented by counsel. State v. Bray,
Baltimore City Criminal Court, January Term, 1948. See also United States
v. Moore, 101 F. 2d 56 (2nd Cir., 1939).
"337 U. S. 241 (1949).
"201 Md. 25, 92 A. 2d 570 (1952).6 Manning v. United States, 161 F. 2d 827 (5th Cir., 1947).
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examine all witnesses, including the probation officer. After
the "state's case", the defendant may call any witness in
his behalf and/or take the stand in his own defense. The
Court, and in some instances the probation officer, directs
examination of the witnesses. A representative of the
State's Attorney's Office does not participate unless re-
quested to so do by either the Court or the probation
department.
The rules governing a probationer's conduct have been
mentioned before, and the Court must find a violation of
one or more of said rules to hold a defendant guilty of
violating his probation. What amounts to a violation of
these rules is largely a question of fact within the discre-
tion of the trial judge,6" and it has been held that probation
can be revoked on the basis of a probation officer's report.6
In reversing a trial court's finding of a violation of proba-
tion, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that such a
finding is reviewable not only as to the abuse of discretion,
but also as to whether an erroneous construction has been
placed by the trial judge on the condition on which the
sentence was suspended.67
If a verdict of not guilty is decided upon, naturally, the
defendant continues on probation; but, if a verdict of guilty
has been decided upon or guilt has been admitted, the
Court may either impose the suspended sentence or, in a
deserving case, continue the defendant on probation. The
Court upon revoking probation may impose, under the
specific authority of Section 279 of the Charter and Public
Local Laws of Baltimore City (Flack, 1949), any sentence
which might have originally been imposed for the crime of
which said probationer was convicted.68 However, it could
be argued that to impose a sentence greater than that which
was originally passed, could in effect subject the defendant
to "double jeopardy".6 9 It is also unresolved whether the
Court could at that point impose a reduced sentence con-
sistent with Rule 744(c) of the Maryland Rules of Practice."
Quaere, what sentence, if any, can be imposed where an
order granting probation before conviction has been re-
voked? Two views on this question are noted, one of them
having held that probation before conviction is tantamount
to a finding of guilty, and it therefore follows that upon its
Swann v. State, 200 Md. 420, 425-6, 90 A. 2d 690 (1952).
People v. McClean, 130 Cal. App. 2d 439, 279 P. 2d 87 (1955).
0 Supra, n. 63.
U Cf. Hite v. State, 198 Md. 602, 607-8, 84 A. 2d 899 (1951).
9 Cf. Pollard v. United States, ... U. S. 77 S. Ct. 481 (1957).
70 Supra, circa, n. 33.
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revocation a sentence can be imposed.7 1 The remaining
view holds that the finding of probation before conviction
does not of itself record any verdict in a criminal case, and
upon revocation a defendant must be retried in a different
proceeding for his original offense before any sentence can
be imposed.72
In conclusion, the foregoing text has outlined the high-
lights of the probationary services of the Supreme Bench
of Baltimore, with some historical background. As a final
note, it should be observed that probation, as heretofore
stated, is a relatively new process for handling the criminal
offender. Treatment philosophy has progressed greatly
since the common-law days of chopping off the hands of
convicted pickpockets, and modern methods seek to pro-
vide earnest social adjustment and control to those in our
community who have strayed from the path of social order.
Presently, at least from the academic point of view, proba-
tion is but a mere fractional phase of the transition from
common-law standards of punishment to the modern day
philosophies of criminologists and sociologists. This should
not be the extent of our progression. Probation points out
a path and direction for future development of the control
and treatment of the malefactor. It should be the responsi-
bility of the legal profession, shared equally with the crimi-
nologist and sociologist, to discover new methods to over-
come a social handicap.
See State v. Palmer, Baltimore City Criminal Court, September Term,
1953, also State v. Stump, Baltimore City Criminal Court, May Term, 1953.
71 See State v. Primeaux, Baltimore City Criminal Court, May Term, 1954.
When a rehearing of the original case is ordered, testimony previously
obtained can be used in lieu of requiring former witnesses to appear, for
in receiving probation before conviction, a defendant agrees in writing to
the use of recorded testimony in subsequent hearings.
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Those of you who attended the School of Law in recent
years undoubtedly remember with fondness Professor Rus-
sell R. Reno, who, without exception, made each class a
stimulating, as well as instructive, session. This effect,
apart from sheer academic ability, is the result of an almost
limitless enthusiasm for the subject matter, coupled with
an enviable capacity to organize its presentation to the
fledgling law student. His lead article "The Maryland Order
of Abatement of Legacies and Devises", demonstrates the
aforementioned qualities as an aid to the attorney who
finds himself charged with the administration of an estate,
the assets of which are insufficient to accomplish in full
the testator's directions. After tracing the historically in-
ferior position of the legatee of personalty as contrasted to
the devisee of realty, the author succinctly presents and
intricately analyzes the current revised order of abatement
in this State. This is followed by an exhaustive discussion
of the difficulties arising upon renunciation of a will by the
EDITORIAL
surviving spouse and an election to take as a statutory
heir, together with the means by which the courts seek to
preserve the testamentary scheme so often marred by such
election. Professor Reno obtained both his A.B. (1931) and
LL.B. (1927) at the University of Illinois, and an LL.M.
from Columbia University in 1940. He is currently teaching
courses in Real Property I. Real Property II (Conveyances),
Testamentary Law and Restitution.
The Rvmw is particularly pleased when it is able to
present a lead article by one of the more recent graduates
of the School. Mr. Herbert B. Mutter's "Probation in the
Criminal Court of Baltimore City" affords an interesting
and informative glimpse into a department, the operations
and purposes of which are perhaps little known by many
Maryland attorneys. For the offenders who are investigated
and supervised by the department, however, the relation-
ship may have profound consequences. Criminological
theories of the ethics of punishment have evolved from the
vengeance, through the deterrence and into the recidivistic.
The Probation Department is by its very nature interwoven
into the last of these theories, its purpose being neither to
punish for punishment's sake nor to deter others from pur-
suring the same course of criminal conduct, but to deal
with the offender as an individual, evaluating his potential-
ities for future social good, or damage. The author, in a
clear and interesting article, tells us how this is accom-
plished. A political science and sociology major at the
University of Maryland, Mr. Mutter was a June, 1957,
graduate of the School of Law. During 1952 and 1953, he
was employed by the National Training School for Boys in
Washington, D.C., and the District of Columbia House of
Correction. Since 1953 he has been associated with the
Probation Department of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore
City, where he is a probation officer, making investigations
for the Criminal Court, as well as supervising released
offenders. Mr. Mutter was appointed by Governor McKeldin
as a member of the Maryland Commission for the Preven-
tion and Treatment of Juvenile Delinquency, and presently
serves in that capacity.
The REVIEw enters the school year 1957-58 with the fol-
lowing student editors: Editor, Samuel Lyles Freeland;
Casenote Editor, Robert F. Hochwarth; Recent Decisions
Editor, Martin B. Greenfeld; and Assistant Casenote Editor,
J. M. Roulhac. The last named post is newly created with
the intent that it be filled, as currently, by a fourth year
evening student with the primary responsibility of super-
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vising at student level those evening students participating
in Law Review activities. The editors wish to thank their
predecessors for winding up their year with publication on
schedule and with a good start on the material for the cur-
rent issue.
The RL w announces the appointment of a second
faculty advisor, Professor Lewis D. Asper. The advisability
of having two faculty advisors has been under considera-
tion since the current organization of the REVIEW was first
announced in the Summer issue of 1956, and action was
stimulated late this summer at Professor Reiblich's request
after his appointment by Governor McKeldin to the newly
established "Self-Survey Commission of the Maryland
State Government" and his subsequent selection to be its
Executive Secretary. Professor Reiblich felt that these new
duties, added to those as a member of the Advisory Board
of the Patuxent Institution, might preclude his giving the
REviEw the time required for its continuing successful
operation, and further that the faculty had available in
Professor Asper a younger man, with experience at the
Bar as well as wide teaching experience, who could render
the necessary assistance. Professor Asper, a member of the
New York Bar, came to Maryland in 1954 and is currently
teaching the courses in Contracts, Negotiable Instruments,
Trade Regulation and a Seminar in Selected Legal Prob-
lems. In addition to these fields, he has previously taught
International Law, Comparative Law, Conflict of Laws, and
Insurance. He has his A.B. degree from the University of
Minnesota, 1943, and his LL.B. from Columbia University,
1951, having served with the United States Marine Corps
during 1943-1945. He taught at the University of Puerto
Rico, 1951-52, and practiced law in New York City, 1952-
1954, with the firm of Kissam & Halpin. The REVIw is
gratified that he is willing to assist with its work.
NEWS OF THE LAW SCHOOL
There are 433 students enrolled in the Law School for
the school year 1957-58. Of these 167 are in the Day School,
with 72 in the entering class; 266 are in the Evening School,
with 97 in the entering class. There are 116 colleges and
universities represented in the pre-legal training of the
student body.
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Comments and Casenotes
"Gross Receipts" Apportionment Formula In State
Taxation Of Foreign Corporation Operating
Partly Through Subsidiaries
Household Finance Corp. v. State Tax Commission1
In 1953, Household Finance Corporation, a foreign
finance corporation, was engaged in a nation-wide small
loan business. Although the corporation itself did busi-
ness in Maryland, a part of its out-of-state operations was
conducted through ten wholly owned subsidiaries. Mary-
land imposes an annual tax on "[s]o much of the capital
stock of foreign finance corporations doing business in
Maryland as represents the business done in this State...,"
The State Tax Commission is directed to determine the
total value of all the capital stock of such a company." It
next must allocate to Maryland that portion of this total
value as fairly represents the business done in Maryland.
The statute provides that:
".... in apportioning the value of the shares between
the business within and without Maryland, it shall be
presumed in the absence of clear evidence to the con-
trary that the value of the property and business with-
in Maryland bears to the value of the total business
and property the same ratio which the gross receipts
or earnings in Maryland . . . bears to the total gross
receipts of earnings . . ."4
In the year 1953, the Commission arrived at $163,262,300
as the total value of all the stock. In order to allocate to
Maryland its proper portion of this valuation, the Commis-
sion multiplied it by a fraction the numerator of which was
the gross receipts of Household in Maryland ($2,481,626),
and the denominator of which was the total gross receipts
of Household everywhere ($61,812,951). This last figure
was not the gross receipts of Household and all its sub-
sidiaries figured on a consolidated basis ($75,000,000); it
1 212 Md. 80, 128 A. 2d 640 (1957).
2 MD. CODE (1951), Art. 81, sec. 7 (7).8 Tbid, Art. 81, secs. 20(a), 20(b), 19(a).
'Ibid, Art. 81, sec. 20(a). Omitted from the quotation of the statutory
language are several references to the treatment of income from permanent
investments which were not material In the instant case.
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was the gross receipts of the parent corporation alone. The
result of this multiplication was a figure of about $6,500,000,
which was the Commission's assessment of the value of
that part of the capital stock of Household that represented
"the business done in Maryland". Household appealed to
the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, claiming, inter alia,
that the failure of the Commission's gross receipts fraction
to include in its denominator consolidated gross receipts
of the parent and the subsidiaries necessarily resulted in a
larger portion of the total capital stock being attributed to
Maryland than should have been, and that the tax was in-
valid because it was not imposed in accordance with the
Maryland statutory language and because it accomplished
the taxation of extra territorial values in violation of the
"due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The Circuit Court found for
Household. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals
affirmed, Judges Hammond and Henderson dissenting.
The majority opinion written by Judge Prescott ex-
plains the holding as follows:
".... if the Commission sees fit to arrive at the total
value of a unitary enterprise on a consolidated basis, it
cannot in fairness apportion that value as between
Maryland and other jurisdictions on a basis which is
inconsistent with, and which rejects, an element used
in building up that value. Here, of course, that element
is the earnings of the subsidiaries. They have been dis-
carded and the gross earnings of the parent company
only have been used for the apportionment.
"We have reached the conclusion above stated on
the basis of our statute, and we have not found it neces-
sary to seek to determine the limit of the constitutional
power of the State in imposing or apportioning a tax
such as that here involved."'5
Judge Hammond in his dissenting opinion6 disputed the
Court's holding that the Commission's use of the apportion-
ing formula was at odds with the statutory directive that
"it shall be presumed in the absence of clear evidence to
the contrary that the value of the property and business
within Maryland bears to the value of total business and
property the same ratio which gross receipts or earnings in
Maryland .. .bears to the total gross receipts of earn-
5 Supra, n. 1, 98.
6 Supra, n. 1, di8. op. 99, In which Judge Henderson concurred.
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ings.. ."' He presented various comparative financial data
to support his belief that this presumption was justified in
this instance.' It is interesting that nowhere in the ma-
jority opinion was there presented any factual evidence in
the nature of operating or financial statistics to refute the
presumption in the statute. The Court relied on the fact
that:
"The result has been to produce a considerably
larger apportionment of value to Maryland than would
have been reached if the gross earnings of subsidi-
aries, ... had been used in determining the ratio of
gross receipts in Maryland to gross receipts outside of
Maryland."
This fact is indisputable, but does it per se establish that
the statutory formula used by the Commission imputes to
Maryland a higher percentage of the value of Household's
total business than actually belongs here? Or, should the
presumption be discarded only when concrete facts and
figures are submitted proving that the presumption is fac-
tually incorrect in the particular case? This was the line
of cleavage between the members of the Court, and upon
this point the case was decided.
It was therefore unnecessary to examine the constitu-
tionality of the apportioning formula as applied to House-
hold, but this second aspect of the matter is of interest in
its own right and also to the extent that it reflects light on
the initial problem of statutory interpretation. The con-
stitutional doctrine here applicable seems to be that any
statutory formula reasonable on its face (as is the one in
the instant case)' ° is valid and constitutional unless it is
Supra, n. 4.
Supra, n. 6, 104. For instance, consolidated net income of Household
everywhere was 43.3% of consolidated gross income, but Maryland net in-
come was 50% of Maryland gross. Each dollar of consolidated assets pro-
duced 9 cents of net income; each dollar of Maryland assets produced 12
cents. Maryland assets comprised only 2.8% of consolidated assets but
produced 3.81% of consolidated net Income. Judge Hammond argued from
these figures that the Maryland business of Household had a relatively
higher "going concern" value than Household's average business and con-
cluded that the figure of $6,500,000 (about 4% of the value of Household's
entire property and business) was perfectly reasonable as a proper evalu-
ation of the Household property and business in Maryland.
9 Supra, n. 1, 98.
a The fact that In the case of a unitary enterprise, property outside of
the taxing state may be taken into consideration in order to arrive at a
value of the taxable property within the state has long been well settled.
"The only reason for allowing a State to look 'beyond its borders
when it taxes the property of foreign corporations is that it may get
'the true value of the things within it, when they are part of an organic
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shown by clear and cogent evidence that the formula pro-
duces "a palpably disproportionate result"." In other
words, there is a presumption of constitutionality which
can be rebutted only by clear evidence that values outside
the state are being taxed in the present instance. It is
apparent that this constitutional presumption and the statu-
tory presumption in Sec. 20(a) are very nearly identical. 2
Hence, it would appear that the same considerations used
in determining when this presumption of constitutionality
breaks down would be helpful also in determining when
the statutory presumption in Sec. 20(a) is invalid. And, of
course, the most important consideration that concerns us
is what is meant by "clear and cogent evidence".
There is an astonishing lack of direct authority on the
problem posed by the fact situation in the instant case. In
one of the few similar cases, People v. Knapp," Judge Car-
dozo sitting on the Court of Appeals of New York, was
asked to rule upon the validity of a franchise 4 tax imposed
system of wide extent, that gives them a value above what they other-
wise would possess."
Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66, 69 (1920).
The Maryland Court of Appeals had no difficulty at all in finding that
Household was engaged in such a unitary enterprise.
"... Through the operation of Its headquarters, and the combined
borrowing power . . ., the most advantageous rates of interest may be
attained with resultant benefit to all parts of the corporate body. The
branches in Maryland, . . . contributed to the whole; and, naturally,
obtained many benefits therefrom."
212 Md. 80, 95, 128 A. 2d 640 (1957).
2N. & W. Ry. Co. v. N. Carolina, 297 U. S. 682, 688 (1936) ; Harvester
Co. v. Evatt, 329 U. S. 416, 422 (1947).
"This should not be surprising because undoubtedly the statutory pre-
sumption was created and designed among other reasons to minimize the
possibility of unconstitutional applications in particular cases.
"230 N. Y. 48, 129 N. E. 202 (1920).
u It may be well at this point to consider the nature of the tax Imposed
on foreign finance corporations by Md. Code (1951), Art. 81, sec. 20(a), (b).
There are two broad classifications in the area of state taxation of foreign
corporations: (1) "property" taxes and (2) all the various other types,
which can be lumped together under the term "excise" taxes. Property
taxes are subject to the constitutional requirements of uniformity of taxa-
tion and the requirement of taxation according to value, whereas the excise
taxes are not. See 14 FLErcHiER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATONS (Perm. ed., 1945),
§6902. On the other hand, sometimes an excise tax will fail when, if It
had been deemed to be a property tax, it would have been sustained. See
Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U. S. 359 (1954), where the Court
decided that the tax was not a property tax and hence was void as a
privilege tax Imposed on the privilege of doing Interstate business.
Often it is difficult to determine in which category a particular Income,
franchise, license, privilege, or other tax belongs. The distinction is often
very subtle. For instance, it Is settled that It Is beyond a state's power to
tax the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce; yet taxes can validly
be levied on property used in interstate commerce, e.g., see Adams Express
Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194 (1897).
It would appear that the Maryland tax concerned here is a property tax.
It is listed as such in the statute itself, and is clearly designed to operate
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on that part of a foreign corporation's net income which was
attributed to New York by the following statutory formula.
Its net income was to be multiplied by a fraction the numer-
ator of which consisted of the monetary value of certain of
its assets located in New York, and the denominator of
which consisted of the total value of these types of assets
wherever situated. The resulting figure was taxable in
New York. It happened that a substantial part of the tax-
payer's net income derived from bonds held outside New
York and that the value of bonds held by the corporation
was not includable in either numerator or denominator of
the apportioning fraction. The Court held that the tax was
bad on constitutional grounds. 5 It made no finding that
the actual result was disproportionate or excessive. For all
that appears the formula may have attributed a smaller
percentage of the entire net income to New York than was
in fact earned there. However, under the circumstances of
the case the formula was bad in theory and was therefore
rejected without further ado.'6
However, other cases in which taxes of this sort have
been struck down have emphasized and relied on the fac-
as a tax on the value of the business in Maryland; Art. 81, Sec. 7(7). Also,
the tangible personal property of the taxpayer is exempt from the ordinary
tax imposed on such personalty; Sec. 8(14). Likewise the assessed value
of realty owned by such a corporation is to be subtracted from the value
of the tax base (total capital stock) before the tax is assessed; Sec. 19(b).
These provisions evidence a legislative intent not to tax the corporation's
physical property twice and to this extent indicate that the tax is a prop-
erty tax. The problem was touched upon, but not decided, in Commercial
Corp. v. Tax Comm., 181 Md. 234, 239, 29 A. 2d 294 (1942), where the Court
mentioned in passing the Commission's contention that the tax was not on
the property of the corporation but on the privilege of doing business in
the state (which would make it an excise tax).
1Supra, n. 13, 206.
"Here, . . . the statute prescribes a rule of allocation which, as
applied to foreign corporations holding bonds . . . in other states, in-
volves an artificial and arbitrary augmentation of the value of the
local privilege. It measures -the value of the franchise, here and else-
where, by income from all sources, and excludes some of the same
sources when the value is apportioned. To take from assets elsewhere
is equivalent to adding to assets here."
16 Certiorari to the U. S. Supreme Court was denied; 256 U. S. 702 (1921).
Judge Cardozo cited and relied heavily on Oklahoma v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
223 U. S. 298 (1912). In this case the tax was Imposed on that part of the
gross receipts of an express company which were apportioned to Oklahoma
by the use of a fraction, the numerator of which was "business done" in
Oklahoma and the denominator of which was "business done" everywhere.
Apparently substantial Income was realized from bonds and land outside
of Oklahoma. This Income was included in the measure of the tax, i.e., the
total gross receipts, but was excluded from the denominator of the appor-
tioning fraction, evidently on the theory that it was not a part of the
"business done" by the company. Judge Cardozo said of 'this case:
"The scheme of allocation limited the assessors to the comparison
of the receipts of business done within the state with the receipts of
business there and elsewhere. Investments in bonds and lands were
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tual showing of a disproportionate result effected in the in-
dividual instance. Fargo v. Hart17 is an early leading case
which condemned a property tax on the assets of an express
company apportioned by using a mileage ratio (number
of miles of track within the state to total miles every-
where), because the allocation fraction imputed much more
property to the taxing state than was actually in the state.
The Court speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes cited fac-
tual evidence to prove that the result reached was errone-
ous; e.g., the total assets of the company were valued at
$22,000,000; those situated in the taxing state at $8,000. But
the worth of the latter was assessed at $800,000 by the oper-
ation of the statutory formula. 8 Wallace v. Hines," a later
case, made a similar holding. Another case" struck down
a tax on freight cars produced by an apportionment formula
which attributed a daily average of over 400 freight cars
to the taxing state; the taxpayer proved by its figures that
the actual daily average was 57 cars. In the celebrated
Hans Rees case,2' the Court condemned the tax on a show-
ing that the allocation formula allotted 80% of total income
disregarded in the apportionment, though the income from such in-
vestments was included in the measure. On that ground, as well as on
others, the statute was held invalid."
Supra, n. 13, 206. There is little doubt that the case was authority for the
proposition made out for it by Judge Cardozo, but it seems to have lost its
vitality in this regard because it has never since been cited for this purpose,
but has repeatedly been used as authority for its other entirely distinct doc-
trine that a state tax on the gross receipts of interstate business is viola-
tive of the "commerce clause" of Article 1, §8 of the U. S. Constitution. See,
for example, Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50 (1922) ; Matson
Nay. Co. v. State Board, 297 U. S. 444 (1936); McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1940) ; Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S.
292 (1944).
In a later case involving the same New York statute under very similar
factual circumstances, the Supreme Court rejected a demand for the
application of the doctrine in the Knapp case and sustained the tax. It
relied partially, however, on the fact that the issue had not been raised in
the lower court. Bass, etc., Ltd. v. Tax Comm., 266 U. S. 271 (1924).11193 U. S. 490 (1904).
18 The Court also based its decision on the impropriety of including in the
measure of the tax (gross assets) investments which had nothing to do
with the running of the business in the taxing state, i.e., it made the point
that when a business is not entirely unitary in its nature, that part of it
which differs from the business carried on within the taxing state should
not be considered in determining the value of the business in the taxing
state.
19Supra, n. 10. Here, a North Dakota excise tax was imposed on that
part of a railroad's capital that was used In the state. Again, the appor-
tioning formula was a track mileage fraction, and again, the actual facts
of the case indicated that the result of the statutory formula was erroneous.
It was shown that the very valuable terminals of the railroad were in other
states and that in North Dakota there were for the most part only long
stretches of track running through sparsely populated territory.
"D Union Tank Line v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275 (1919).21 Hans Rees' Sons v. No. Carolina, 283 U. S. 123 (1931).
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to North Carolina, while the evidence showed that only
17% of it was in fact derived from operations in that state.
In all these cases the statutory formula was constitutional
on its face and the Court in voiding the tax relied to a
greater or lesser degree on evidence that the actual result
of the allocation formula (without regard to the theory of
its composition and computation) was erroneous and unfair.
There are a number of decisions indicating that the
theory of the allocating formula is immaterial if the result
produced by it is in line with the realities of the situation.22
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. North Carolina," is a
very significant case. There North Carolina sought to tax
that part of an interstate railroad's net income that was
attributable to the state. The statute required that the
average gross income per mile of system track be computed
and that North Carolina's share be assigned on the basis
of the number of miles of track located in that state. The
same procedure was to be followed in allocating to the state
its portion of total operating expenses. The expenses at-
tributable to North Carolina then were to be subtracted
from the gross income allocated to it and the resulting
figure was to be the net income taxable in North Carolina.
The railroad sought to have the tax voided on the ground
that its actual operating expenses were substantially
greater than the expenses attributed to it by the statutory
formula. Proof was submitted which left little question
of this fact. Nevertheless, the Court sustained the tax. It
reasoned that there was a possibility that the operation of
2 "However, it is apparent from the result reached that we cannot say the
evidence of the plaintiff clearly and convincingly shows the method used
by the commission is In error, ..."
Knappton Towboat Company v. Chambers, 202 Or. 618, 276 P. 2d
425, 429 (1954). (Emphasis supplied.)
"The method or formula used by the taxing authorities . . . is not
disclosed. This we do not regard as of controlling importance. If the
result arrived at was clearly within the permissive limits of their dis-
cretion, the particular method used would seem unimportant."
Bailey v. Megan, 102 F. 2d 651, 654 (8th Cir., 1939).
The question lies solely in the result, which must not culminate
in gross injustice or over-assessment."
Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. Brown, 32 F. Supp. 784, 792
(E. D. Mich., 1940).
See also Pacific Fruit Express Co. v. McColgan, 67 Cal. App. 2d 93, 153
P. 2d 607, 612 (1944), where the Court conceded that the Commissioner's
application of the allocating formula was in error, but refused to give the
taxpayer any relief because the taxpayer:
"... failed to show that the formula applied resulted in the payment
of more taxes than in equity and good conscience it should have paid,
or that under the formula applied it had paid a tax measured by more
than the amount of net income reasonably and fairly attributable to
the business done in the state."
2297 U. S. 682 (1936).
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the formula attributed to North Carolina less gross income
than was in fact derived from that state and therefore there
might have been a compensating error which would save
the final result. 4 The Norfolk & Western case holds firmly
and explicitly that the taxpayer must prove that the final
net result of the allocation formula is wrong, and failing
this, he cannot rely on defects or flaws inherent in the
formula to save him.25 And it seems to be established that
in the case of an unitary enterprise it is very difficult to
satisfy the court that the assessment is too high, that the
result produced by the formula is arbitrary and unfair.
Consider, for example, Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp,26
upholding a franchise tax formula which attributed
$23,000,000 of capital stock to the taxing state in spite of
the fact that the company had tangible assets in that state
in the value of only $3,000,000. Other cases hold similarly
in analogous circumstances.
One Pennsylvania case 28 dealt tangentially with the very
problem in the instant case. The Court sustained the tax;
it was not impressed by the argument that the gross re-
ceipts of the subsidiaries should be included in the denomi-
nator of the allocating fraction.29
It would seem that the courts have indicated that the
net product of the formula is what counts, not its theoretical
26 "For all that appears in the case developed by the Railway, actual
gross revenues in North Carolina may have been so far in excess of
average gross revenues computed under the statute as to neutralize the
discrepancy between actual and average cost of operation. If such a
counter balance exists, appellant has not been injured through the
application of the formula."
"We must bear in mind steadily that the burden is on the taxpayer
to make oppression manifest by clear and cogent evidence."
Ibid, 686, 688.
Justice Cardozo asked:
"Would it have had to pay less if net income had been ascertained
without reference to mileage? Would the difference have been so great
as to overpass the bounds of reason? In the evidence for the railway,
there is no answer to those questions .... the state in presenting com-
putations did not lift the burden from the railway of satisfying the
court, after all the evidence was in, that it was a victim of oppression."
Supra, n. 23, 688-9.
308 U. S. 331 (1939). The Court says at page 336:
"In a unitary enterprise, property outside the state, when correlated
in use with property within the state, necessarily affects the worth of
the privilege within the state. . . . The weight, . . . given the property
beyond the state boundaries is but a recognition of the very real effect
its existence has upon the value of the privilege granted within the
taxing state."
Underwood T'writer Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920) ; Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412 (1937) ; Butler Bros. v. McColgan,
315 U. S. 501 (1942).
21 Commonwealth v. Ford Motor Co., 350 Pa. 236, 38 A. 2d 329 (1944).
Ibtd, 334.
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imperfections." Perhaps this approach has merit also in
construing these statutes. If so, a statutory presumption
that "the value of the property and business within Mary-
land bears to the value of the total business and property
the same ratio which the gross receipts . . . in Maryland
bears to the total gross receipts.. ." should not be cast aside
in the absence of clear factual evidence that it is wrong.
P. McEvoY CROMWELL
Court Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilian Dependents
Overseas - Unconstitutional
Reid v. Covert' and Kinsella v. Krueger2
Mrs. Covert and Mrs. Smith were tried and convicted by
courts-martial of the alleged murder of their respective
husbands, members of the United States military forces
stationed outside the continental limits of the United States.
Both women were returned to the United States and con-
fined at the Federal Reformatory for Women, Alderson,
West Virginia. Mrs. Smith's conviction was affirmed by
the Board of Review and the Court of Military Appeals,
while Mrs. Covert's conviction was set aside by the Court
of Military Appeals and she was transferred to the District
of Columbia jail to await rehearing by court-martial at
Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.
8 See also Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U. S. 416, 422 (1947), where the
Court said:
"Unless a palpably disproportionate result comes down from an
apportionment . . . this Court has not been willing to nullify honest
state efforts to make apportionments."
And Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290, 296 (1922):
"If this same amount of tax had been imposed ... without reference
being made to the basis of its computation, very certainly no objec-
tion to its validity would have been thought of."
Cf. State of Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444 (1940), where
the Court said:
"The Constitution is not a formulary. It does not demand of states
strict observance of rigid categories nor precision of technical phrasing
in their exercise of the most basic power of government, that of taxa-
tion. For constitutional purposes the decisive issue turns on the operat-
ing incidence of a challenged tax. A state is free to pursue its own
fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the practical
operation of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation to oppor-
tunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to
benefits which it has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized
society."
1353 U. S ... , 77 S. Ot. 1222 (1957).
2 Ibid.
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Petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed in Mrs.
Smith's behalf and by Mrs. Covert, contending the prisoners
were not subject to court-martial jurisdiction because
Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice3
violated Article III, Section 2 and the Sixth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution guaranteeing the right to trial by
jury to civilians. Mrs. Covert's petition also contended that
whatever jurisdiction the military may have acquired to
try her under Article 2(11) was lost by her return to the
United States and delivery to the custody of civilian au-
thorities. The United States District Court for the District
of Columbia ordered the writ to issue on Mrs. Covert's
petition and the government appealed directly to the United
States Supreme Court. The District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia issued a preliminary writ on the
petition filed in Mrs. Smith's behalf, but after hearing, dis-
charged the writ. While an appeal was pending before the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Government
itself sought certiorari.
In the original hearing, the Supreme Court held the
provision of the Code extending court martial jurisdiction
to civilians accompanying armed forces abroad in peace-
time did not violate the constitutional right to trial by jury,
and further held that such jurisdiction, once validly at-
tached, was not lost by the transfer of the civilian to a
penal institution in the United States after her conviction. 4
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Douglas dissented, indicating a belief the majority opinion
would give to the military "new powers not hitherto
thought consistent with our scheme of government",' but
postponed filing their dissents until the next Term of
Court. In an unusual "reservation", Mr. Justice Frank-
furter neither concurred with nor dissented from the ma-
jority opinion but, after strongly criticizing that majority
opinion, reserved for a later date the expression of his
views.
8 70 Stat. 911 (1956), 50 U. S. C. A. 1552 (11) (1956).
Persons subject to this chapter (Article 2) :
"(11) Subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which
the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of
international law, all persons serving with, employed by, or accompany-
ing the armed forces without the continental limits of the United States
and without the following territories: That part of Alaska east of longi-
tude one hundred and seventytwo degrees west, the Canal Zone, the
main group of the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands;"
'Reid v. Covert, 351 U. S. 487 (1956) ; Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U. S. 470
(1956).
5 Ibid, di8. op. 485, 486.
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Petition for rehearing in the cases as consolidated was
granted' and counsel were invited to include discussion of
four questions 7 relating to the practical necessity for and
alternatives to court-martial jurisdiction over civilian de-
pendents overseas, historical evidence bearing on the scope
of court-martial jurisdiction, and the relevance of any dis-
tinction between civilian employees and civilian depend-
ents and between major crimes and petty offenses. On the
rehearing, the Court reversed its earlier decision,' holding
Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert could not constitutionally be
tried by military authorities and ordering their release from
custody. Mr. Justice Brennan joined the three Justices
who had dissented at the first hearing in the new majority
opinion, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice
Harlan concurred in separate opinions. Mr. Justice Clark
and Mr. Justice Burton dissented.
In its first decision, the Court conceded that trial by
court-martial of a civilian entitled to trial in an Article III
court would be a violation of the Constitution,9 but it found
the Constitution does not require trial before an Article III
court in a foreign country for offenses committed there by
an American citizen. Relying on the decisions in In re
Ross10 and the "Insular Cases",' the Court stated that Con-
gress had the power to establish legislative or consular
courts and, since the choice among different types of legis-
352 U. S. 901 (1956).
Ibid:
"'1. The specific practical necessities in the government and regula-
tion of the land and naval forces which justify court-martial Jurisdic-
tion over civilian dependents overseas; the practical alternatives to the
exercise of jurisdiction by court-martial.
"'2. The historical evidence, so far as such evidence Is available and
relevant, bearing on the scope of court-martial jurisdiction authorized
under Art. I, §8, cl. 14, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, and bear-
ing on the relations of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments in Interpreting those clauses. In particular, the question whether
such historical evidence points to the conclusion that the Art. I, §8,
cl. 14, power was thought to have a fixed and rigid content or rather
that this power, as modified by the Necessary and Proper Clause, was
considered a broad grant susceptible of expansion under changing
circumstances.
"'3. The relevance, for purposes of court-martial Jurisdiction over
civilians overseas In time of peace, of any distinction between civilians
employed by the armed forces and civilian dependents.
"'4. The relevance, for purposes of court-martial Jurisdiction over
civilian dependents overseas in time of peace, of any distinctions be-
tween major crimes and petty offenses'."
S upra, n. 4.
"Ibd, 474, citing Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955).
20 140 U. S. 453 (1891).
1 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901) ; Hawaii v. Manklchi, 190 U. S.
197 (1903) ; Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138 (1904) ; Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U. S. 298 (1922).
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lative tribunals "is peculiarly within the power of Con-
gress","2 the power to establish such courts necessarily in-
cludes the power to provide for trial before a military tri-
bunal if that choice is "reasonable and consonant with due
process", is
In the second hearing, the Court could find no constitu-
tional basis for military trial of the prisoners but rather
"under our Constitution courts of law alone are given power
to try civilians for their offenses against the United
States". 4 Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred on
the narrow ground that the constitutional bar applied to
the trial by court-martial in capital cases of civilian de-
pendents accompanying members of the armed forces
abroad in peacetime. The reversal resulted from an
analysis - actually, three separate analyses - of the power
of Congress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, of the Con-
stitution "'to make Rules for the Government and Regula-
tion of the land and naval Forces'" - a power the Court
found "no need to examine" in its first opinion."
Civilian courts are the normal repositories of power to
try persons charged with crimes against the United States
and the Constitution has provided a number of specific safe-
guards to protect persons brought before these courts."
The jurisdiction of military tribunals, in the words of the
four Justices joining in the Court's opinion, is a "very
limited and extraordinary jurisdiction"'7 arising out of the
Article I power, the scope of which cannot be so extended
by the "Necessary and Proper" Clause 8 to permit military
jurisdiction over any other group of persons than those
literally in the land and naval forces. 9 "Having rmn up
against the steadfast bulwark of the Bill of Rights, the
Necessary and Proper Clause cannot extend the scope of
Clause 14'.2 °
Neither the concurring Justices nor the dissenting Jus-
tices could find such rigid confines on the power of Con-
gress to make rules for the government and regulation of
Supra, n. 4, 478.
Ibid, 476.
"353 U. S.... ... 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1243 (1957).
351 U. S. 470, 476 (1956).
'OSupra, n. 14 ... , 1232-3, citing Article III and the Fifth, Sixth and
Eighth Amendments.
Ibid, 1233.
IsArt. I, §8. cl. 18.
19 Although the Court recognized '"there might be circumstances where a
person could be 'in' the armed services for purposes of Clause 14 even
though he had not formally been inducted into the military or did not wear
a uniform." Supra, n. 14, ... , 1233.
20 Ibid.
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the land and naval forces. The power cannot be looked at
in isolation as "It]he Constitution is an organic scheme of
government to be dealt with as an entirety"."1
Thus viewed, Justice Frankfurter stated the question:
".... whether these women dependents are so closely
related to what Congress may allowably deem essen-
tial for the effective 'Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces' that they may be subjected
to court-martial jurisdiction in these capital cases,
when the consequence is loss of the protections afforded
by Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. '22
In reaching a negative answer, he emphasized that the
Court was only dealing with the trial of civilian dependents
in capital cases in time of peace. Unable to accept the
theory that the Article I power is incapable of expansion
under changing conditions, Justices Harlan, the only Jus-
tice reversing his view between the first and second opin-
ions, found a rational connection between the court-martial
jurisdiction invoked and the Article I power supplemented
by the "Necessary and Proper" Clause but found capital
cases to be on sufficiently different footing from those in-
volving other offenses to warrant the full protection of trial
by an Article III court.
The dissent 23 referred to the Court's decision in the Toth
case24 where "Art. I, §8, cl. 14 was 'given its natural mean-
ing' and 'would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction
to persons who are actually members or part of the armed
forces'." Reviewing the practical situation which exists at
military bases throughout the world and the "effect of such
a double standard on discipline, efficiency, and morale", and
the impracticality or undesirability of the alternatives to
court-martial jurisdiction, Justices Clark and Burton con-
cluded that the provision of the Code establishing the mili-
tary jurisdiction is reasonably related to Congress' power
to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces.
In reversing the earlier decision, the four Justices com-
posing the Court did not overrule In re Rosse and the
"Insular Cases"," which provided that earlier decision's
Supra, n. 14, cone. op....... 1243, 1245.
Ibid.
Supra, n. 14, di8. op...... 1262, 1266.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955).
140 U. S. 453 (1891).
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901) ; Hawaii v. Mankichl, 190 U. S.
197 (1903) ; Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138 (1904) ; Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U. S. 298 (1922).
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precedents, but it relegated those decisions to the limbo of
obsolescence: "At best, the Ross case should be left as a
relic from a different era",27 and "it is our judgment that
neither the (Insular) cases nor their reasoning should be
given any further expansion". 28 Again, both Justice Frank-
furter and Justice Harlan, though concurring, join the dis-
senting Justices in attempting to preserve the validity of
the Ross and the Insular Cases decisions, at least to the ex-
tent of their narrow, specialized settings. In fact, Justice
Harlan cites these much-battered decisions as authority in
his concurrence.
Probably the two most pertinent criticisms of the de-
cision of the Court are those raised by the dissent. In re-
versing two prior majority decisions in these cases, the
Court does not do so with a majority opinion. Rather, it
delivers three opinions which are farther apart in some
ways than the concurring opinions and the dissent. Four
Justices see the Bill of Rights as a "bulwark" against Con-
gressional power to make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces. Justice Frank-
furter views the power and the rights as co-equal threads
from the same Constitutional fabric, while to Justice Har-
land the value of the Article III rights increases or de-
creases when measured against the Congressional power,
depending on the gravity of the offense or the possible
punishment involved.
But the most serious criticism raised by the dissent is
that the Court "gives no authoritative guidance as to what,
if anything, the Executive or the Congress may do to
remedy the distressing situation in which they now find
themselves".29 The geographic and numerical extent of
United States military installations and personnel abroad
requires the hiatus created by this decision be filled - a
repair job which could much more satisfactorily be done
had the Court at least indicated which materials might be
acceptable.
RPCHARD R. SIGMON
2 353 U. S....... 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1228 (1957).
28 bidg ..... 1229. Parenthetical material supplied.
2Supra, n. 27, dis. op., ... , 1262.
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Respondeat Superior In "Shoplifting" Cases*
Safeway Stores v. Barrack1
Plaintiff brought suit against the defendant foodstore
and one of its employees to recover damages for malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment. The plaintiff had
made purchases in other stores, and upon entering defen-
dant's store, he placed these bundles in a pushcart along
with various articles he wished to purchase from the de-
fendant. After the plaintiff paid his bill, and while he was
in the act of placing his purchases in a box along with the
bundles he had when he entered the store, a pound of
butter and a small can of pepper fell to the floor. Smith,
an employee of the defendant, who was standing near the
counter, immediately came up to the plaintiff, showed him
a badge, and charged him with trying to avoid payment
by placing the butter and the pepper in the parcels which
he had when he entered the store. The plaintiff denied
Smith's charges, but offered to pay for the items, which
offer Smith refused, whereupon he left the store followed
by Smith. Smith forced the plaintiff to return to the store,
to be taken to a back room where, in the presence of the
store manager, the police were called and plaintiff was
arrested. Smith testified that it was his job to break up
shoplifting; that the retail operations manager had told
him, that he, as retail operations manager, wasn't going to
stop any means of helping to protect the company's prop-
erty; that the plaintiff had been nasty about the whole
affair; and, finally, that the retail operations manager had
told him to use his own discretion if people acted nasty,
and to do what he wanted to with them. The store manager
testified that he did not interfere with the detention of the
plaintiff, since matters of this nature were usually left up
to Smith.
The lower court allowed the case to go to the jury,
which returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $2,500, which
was reduced by remittitur to $1,250. From this verdict the
defendant appealed, contending that the evidence was in-
sufficient to support a finding that Smith was acting within
the scope of his authority in having the plaintiff arrested,
so as to make the defendant store liable for his actions
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The Court of
* To illustrate how serious and extensive the problem of shoplifting is, it
has been conservatively estimated that goods worth over $300,000,000 are
taken from stores by shoplifters annually.
'210 Md. 168, 122 A. 2d 457 (1956).
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Appeals affirmed the judgment, on the ground that the
evidence warranted findings that Smith was employed for
the very purpose of apprehending and prosecuting shop-
lifters and that his actions were in the regular course of
and within the scope of his employment, making the defen-
dant liable. In support of its decision the court cited
McCrory Stores v. Satchell2 and B. C. & A. Ry. Co. v.
Ennalls,8 following the majority rule that, where in false
imprisonment cases, there is conflicting evidence as to the
scope of employment of the agent, it is for the jury to
decide the scope and the extent of the agent's implied
authority in order to determine the principal's liability
under respondeat superior.4
It is interesting to note that, in the development of the
law of principals' responsibility for false imprisonment,
the Court of Appeals in several early cases had accepted
and relied upon the view taken by the New York case of
Mali v. Lord,5 which held that liability for false imprison-
ment by an agent could not be imputed to the principal
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The New York
case reasoned that the principal should not be held, since
an agent could have no implied authority to do an act
which the principal could not justify if he were present
himself. In the McCrory case, relied on in the instant case,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland retreated from its earlier
position, apparently on the theory that all the New York
case decided was that the plaintiff had not introduced evi-
dence as to the agent's scope of authority sufficient to take
the case to the jury. The court also explained the earlier
case of Bernheimer v. Becker,6 on the ground that the
agent in that case was merely an ordinary agent from the
scope of whose employment the authority to cause a false
1 148 Md. 279,129 A. 348 (1925).
s108 Md. 75, 69 A. 638 (1908), where the court held that the determina-
tion of whether an alleged false imprisonment of a suspected thief was
within the general scope of employment of a special officer hired to protect
the property of the Railway Company was for the jury.
,,West v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 215 N. C. 211, 1 S. E. 2d 546 (1939);
Gillis v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 223 N. C. 470, 27 S. E. 2d 283
(1943) ; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Dowling, 43 Ga. App. 549, 159
S. E. 609 (1931); Friedman v. Martin, 43 Ga. App. 677, 160 S. E. 126
(1931) ; Combs v. Kobacker Stores, 114 N. E. 2d 447 (Ohio, 1953) ; Perkins
Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 155 S. W. 556 (Tex. Civ. App., 1913) ; McCrory Stores
v. Satchell, 8upra, n. 2; 1 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §245; 2 MECHEM,
AGENOY (2d ed., 1914) §1982.
539 N. Y. 381 (1868). Maryland cases which cited this case, apparently
adopting its reasoning, are Carter v. Howe Machine Co., 51 Md. 290, 297
(1879) ; Central Railway Co. v. Brewer, 78 Md. 394, 407, 28 A. 615 (1894);
Bernheimer v. Becker, 102 Md. 250, 255, 62 A. 526 (1905).
eIbid.
[VOL. XVII
SAFEWAY STORES v. BARRACK
imprisonment could not be implied so as to make the prin-
cipal liable.
The McCrory case constituted a virtual repudiation by
Maryland of the rule of the Mali case, yet the court did not
expressly reject the rule, seeking to explain the earlier
decision. The principal case, by relying on McCrory v.
Satchell, finally lays to rest the ghost of Mali v. Lord in
Maryland and brings this state squarely into line with the
majority view, holding that the jury can find the principal
liable for false imprisonment if the agent's authority for
such an act can be implied from the general scope of his
employment. The Mali case, which expresses the minority
view, has been subjected to such severe criticism7 and has
been so drastically limited in later New York cases8 that
it is of questionable vigor today.
The liability of a master for a servant's wrong doing is
founded upon the maxim qui facit per alium, facit per se.9
Such liability, though it may involve various tortious acts
by the servant, is governed by the principles of master-
servant rather than by the principles of tort law, since the
liability is imposed on the one who does not commit the
wrongful act himself. It is evident that no problem arises
where there is express authority granted to the agent to
do the act in question, the principal being clearly liable.
The area in which the questions arise is the more nebulous
one of the extension of liability under the doctrine of im-
plied authority. In ascertaining the agent's implied au-
thority in this particular area, or any area, the character
of the position and the duties incidental to it are important
elements for consideration. ° In studying the character of
the position of agents who have no express authority to
protect the principal's property, the terms "manager" and
See, e.g. Field v. Kane, 99 Ill. App. 1 (1901); Staples v. Schmid, 18
R. I. 224, 26 A. 193, 195-6 (1893) ; J. J. Newberry Co. v. Judd, 259 Ky. 309,
82 S. W. 2d 359, 362 (1935) ; Knowles v. Bullene & Co., 71 Mo. App. 341
(1897).8 Palmeri v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 133 N. Y. 261, 30 N. E. 1001 (1892);
Dupre v. Childs, 52 App. Div. 306, 65 N. Y. S. 179 (1900). These cases
limit the ruling of the Mali case to mean that the general employment of
a superintendent, who has general management of the business, does not
warrant his causing the arrest of a person suspected of stealing the prin-
cipal's property; 35 A. L. R. 656. However, the Mali decision was held con-
trolling in the later New York case of Homeyer v. Yaverbaum, 197 App.
Div. 184, 188 N. Y. S. 849 (1921), which involved a store manager and a
suspected shoplifter.
922 AM. Jun. 378, False Imprisonment, §35. "He who acts through an-
other acts himself, [i.e., the acts of an agent are the acts of the principal]."
BLACxK's LAW DiCniONAY (4th ed., 1951) 1413.10 J. J. Newberry Co. v. Judd, supra, n. 7; MECHEM, Op. Cit., 8supra, n. 4,
§1973; 3 COOLEY, ToRTs (4th ed., 1932) §396.
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"assistant manager" carry an inference that their acts are
the acts of the store, inasmuch as they are entrusted with
the general management and custody of the entire business.
This in turn renders the principal liable when such em-
ployees cause the false imprisonment of a customer with
intention of protecting the principal's property, such actions
being incidental to and consistent with the general scope of
such agents' employment.1' Usually a subordinate agent
cannot cause his principal to become liable for false im-
prisonment since the protection of the principal's property
is not normally entrusted to him nor is it his implied duty,
in the absence of delegation to so protect the property.12
When an agent, regardless of his position, is expressly
delegated the duty of protecting the principal's property,
there arises an implied authority to do everything reason-
able and necessary to protect the property, thus giving rise
to liability on the principal for his acts in performance
of such a duty. 3 In lieu of entrusting such a duty to in-
experienced store employees, professional detectives are
sometimes hired, the advantage being that better protec-
tion is afforded the store, and the possibility of liability for
mistaken arrests is diminished by the experience and judg-
ment of such trained persons.'
It is obvious that the principal cannot be held liable for
false imprisonment caused by the agent's own malice or
personal motives, 5 nor can the principal be held liable
where the agent has caused the arrest after the crime has
been committed and the only end it can serve is to vindicate
public justice. This is true since the act was not committed
under any authority from the principal, and bears no rela-
" Birmingham News Co. v. Browne, 228 Ala. 395, 153 So. 773 (1934) ;
McCrory Stores v. Satchell, supra, n. 2; Gillis v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 8upra, n. 4; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Dowling, supra, n. 4.
" Bushardt v. United Inv. Co., 121 S. C. 324, 113 S. E. 637 (1922); Ham-
mond v. Eckerd's of Asheville, 220 N. C. 596, 18 S. E. 2d 151 (1942) ; Rigby
v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 160 Wisc. 228, 151 N. W. 260 (1915) ; Conover
v. Jaffee, 238 App. Div. 147, 263 N. Y. S. 618 (1932).
1 t Long v. Eagle, 5, 10, and 254 Store Co., 214 N. C. 146, 198 S. E. 573
(1938) ; Moseley v. J. G. McCrory Co., 101 W. Va. 480, 133 S. E. 73 (1926) ;
Hurst v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 107 S. W. 2d 183 (Mo., 1937) ; Newton v.
Rhoads Brothers, 24 S. W. 2d 378 (Tex., 1930) ; Staples v. Schmid, supra,
n. 7; Knowles v. Buliene & Co., 8upra, n. 7; McCrory v. Stachell, supra,
n. 2; J. J. Newberry Co. v. Judd, supra, n. 7.
U Adams v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 144 Misc. 27, 257 N. Y. S. 776 (1932);
L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Harmon, 56 Ind. App. 436, 104 N. E. 315 (1914) ; Perkins
Bros. Co. v. Anderson, supra, n. 4. Merely because detectives are hired does
not give rise to an inference that the store owner has given express
authority to arrest suspected thieves, the proper inference being they are
hired to protect his property, with the implied authority attendant there-
with as is necessary or customary to perform his duty.]zCobb v. Simon, 124 Wisc. 467, 102 N. W. 891 (1905).
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tion to the agency purpose of protecting the principal's
property.16 The Court pointed this out in the instant case
by distinguishing it from Nance v. Gall."
Special instructions to agents entrusted with the custody
of the principal's property regarding the arrest of the sus-
pected shoplifter have no effect on the principal's liability,
if again the arrest is within the express or implied authority
of the agent's general scope of employment." Where the
arrest is made by a public officer on the information fur-
nished by a clerk or any agent, the principal can be held
liable if furnishing such information is within the express
or implied authority of the clerk or agent, since there is no
distinction in regard to the master's liability in arresting
or causing an arrest."9 However, when an agent merely
assists a public officer in making an arrest he is under the
direction of the officer rather than his principal and is with-
out the scope of his express or implied authority.2 0
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals affirms its
alignment with the majority rule, eliminating the incon-
sistency which appeared in earlier cases.1
DAvID R. STAMBAUGH
Nuisance Based On Aesthetic Considerations
Feldstein v. Kammauf
Residents of a suburb of Cumberland brought suit
against Feldstein, asking that he be restrained from operat-
ing and maintaining a junk yard on premises owned by him
and his sister. In 1939, the defendant had purchased prop-
1135 A. L. R. 654-6; Pruitt v. Watson, 103 W. Va. 627, 138 S. E. 331 (1927) ;
B. C. & A. Ry. Co. v. Ennalls, 108 Md. 75, 69 A. 638 (1908) ; 1 RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY (1933) §245; 2 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed., 1914) §§1974-1976.
17 Nance v. Gall, 187 Md. 656, 50 A. 2d 120, 51 A. 2d 535 (1947). This case
involved the scope of employment of a railroad supervisor who caused the
arrest of the plaintiff for damage which had already been repaired. The
Court felt that the agent's act was to vindicate public justice, rather than
protecting the railroad's property.
8J. J. Newberry Co. v. Judd, 259 Ky. 309, 82 S. W. 2d 359 (1935);
Knowles v. Bullene & Co., 71 Mo. App. 341 (1897).
19 Zinkfein v. W. T. Grant Co., 236 Mass. 228, 128 N. R. 24 (1920).
2Geary v. Stevenson, 169 Mass. 23, 47 N. E. 508 (1897) ; Meyer v. Monnig
Dry Goods Co., 189 S. W. 80 (Tex. Civ. App., 1916).
See Norvell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 212 Md. 14, 128 A. 2d 591 (1956)
and Banks v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 212 Md. 31, 128 A. 2d 600 (1956).
These recent cases though primarily concerned with malicious prosecution
(but not of shoplifters) cite the principal case with approval with the result
that the prior inconsistencies in the Maryland case law, arising out of the
rule of the Mali case, have been resolved.
1209 Md. 479, 121 A. 2d 716 (1956).
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erty, improved by a large warehouse, in a neighborhood
containing other business and commercial properties and
subject to neither use restriction nor zoning regulations.
He immediately started storing scrap metal and junk and
continued to use his land for this purpose. The original
complainants purchased their property in 1947, at which
time there was some junk stored on the defendant's land,
but the complainants alleged that before 1954 this material
was largely concealed by vegetation. The original com-
plainants were joined by neighbors whose homes had been
built between 1946 and 1954. In 1954, the defendant pur-
chased a tract of land adjacent to his other property and
began conducting junking operations on a large scale, haul-
ing quantities of scrap by rail, smashing the unmanageable
pieces with a large steel ball and burning wiring insulation.
The yard contained an unsightly assortment of barrels,
rails, wire, discs and tanks.
The chancellor decreed: (1) that the defendant reduce
and conceal from the view of all the residents of nearby
property the amount of scrap deposited on his property;
(2) that he not handle any material on the property be-
tween the hours of 9 P.M. and 7 A.M.; (3) that he not burn
anything which might cause offensive smoke, fumes or
soot; (4) that he not block, or allow his customers to block,
the county road leading to the property; (5) that he not
allow rats or mice to congregate on the property; (6) that
in the event he did not conceal the scrap and other ma-
terials, he should remove them from the premises. On
appeal, the defendant contested only that part of the de-
cree concerning the concealment of the scrap on the prem-
ises [(1) and (6)] which, he alleged, would compel him
to discontinue his business on its present site. The only
question which had to be considered, therefore, was
whether the defendant should be required to abide by the
contested part of the decree merely because of the un-
sightliness of his business. The complainants admitted that
a junk yard is not a nuisance per se but they relied heavily
on Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack,8 in which,
although the court refused to enjoin the defendant from
using his property as a storage yard for old automobiles
because the area was clearly a residential community, it
quoted with approval the following from State v. Harper4
State v. Shapiro, 131 Md. 168, 101 A. 703 (1917); Landay v. Zoning
Appeals Board, 173 Md. 460, 196 A. 293, 114 A. L. R. 984 (1938).
8118 W. Va. 608, 191 S. E. 368, 370, 110 A. L. R. 1454 (1937).
'182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451,455, 33 A. L. R. 269 (1923).
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on the power of an equity court to enjoin the use of prop-
erty on purely aesthetic grounds:
"It seems to us that aesthetic considerations are
relative in their nature. With the passing of time, social
standards conform to new ideals. As a race, our sensi-
bilities are becoming more refined and that which
formerly did not offend cannot now be endured. That
which the common law did not condemn as a nuisance
is now frequently outlawed as such by the written law.
This is not because the subject outlawed is of a differ-
ent nature, but because our sensibilities have become
more refined and our ideals more exacting. Nauseous
smells have always come under the ban of the law, but
ugly sights and discordant surroundings may be just
as distressing to keener sensibilities. The rights of
property should not be sacrificed to the pleasure of an
ultra-aesthetic taste. But whether they should be per-
mitted to plague the average or dominant human sensi-
bilities well may be pondered."
The Court of Appeals reversed sections 1 and 6 of the
decree and held, (Brune, C.J., dissenting) that since the
neighborhood was not "clearly residential", since none of
the property was subject to private use restriction or public
zoning regulations, since complainants had bought with
knowledge of the junk yard's existence, and since the de-
cree would have the effect of putting defendant out of busi-
ness, there was insufficient evidence of nuisance to require
that the junk be hidden from view or removed, regard-
less of whether equity may enjoin for purely aesthetic
considerations.
Although the sense of sight may perhaps be considered
superior to that of hearing and smell for purposes of
aesthetic perception, it has not traditionally been protected
under the doctrine of nuisances. In explanation, an early
English case stated that noises and odors manifestly may
adversely affect repose and health, which, like light and
air, are classed as necessities so that an action on the case
lies for their protection.5 This attitude of the early English
law has been reflected in the United States with little
exception.' Slowly, however, a change seems to be taking
5 William Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (1587).
0 Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting, A. & S. P. Co., 72 N. J. L. 285, 62 A.
267, 268 (1905) :
"Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence
rather than of necessity, and It is necessity alone which justifies the
exercise of the police power to take private property without com-
pensation."
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place and matters of taste, which were judicially accounted
as sentiment or luxury in the past, are now being consid-
ered among the necessities of a more sophisticated society.
Because of the judicial prejudice against any legal right
predicated upon a "merely aesthetic" complaint, the courts
have, at times, exercised devious reasoning in granting
equitable relief. Where there have been eyesores so
flagrant that their elimination became a necessity even
from the standpoint of the "average man", they have been
abated or brought under control through reasoning based
upon established grounds rather than mere aesthetics.' An
example of this circuitous reasoning is found in Cochran v.
Preston where the validity of a Baltimore City statute
regulating the height of a building in the Washington
Mounment area was challenged as unconstitutional on the
ground that the inspector of buildings was using the police
power as a cloak to hide purely aesthetic purposes.' The
Court categorically accepted the principle that in the exer-
cise of the police power, property rights cannot be impaired
by the legislative conception of artistic beauty. It was held,
however, that the ordinance was enacted for a more sub-
stantial reason than an aesthetic one - that its purpose
was to protect surrounding buildings from the ravages of
fire. A long and eloquent account of the Baltimore fire of
1904 was included in the opinion in an attempt to justify
the decision on the ground that tall buildings serve as large
funnels, furnishing drafts for flames. It might be suggested
that today the courts would be less critical of a legislative
objective of preserving the architectural beauty of the
particular locality.
While it is true that most cases have held that unsightly
structures are not nuisances even though they adversely
affect the value of adjoining property,9 one noteworthy
exception is Yeager v. Traylor.'0 There the Court held that
the construction of a garage in a strictly residential area
would be permitted if it conformed in architectural design
to the general character of the community and that an
effective screen be provided to hide the unsightly appear-
7 Comment, Billboard Regulation and the Aesthetic Viewpoint with
Reference to california Highways, 17 Cal. L. Rev. 120 (1929).
8 108 Md. 220, 70 A. 113 (1908).
9 Northfield v. Board of Freeholders, 85 N. J. Eq. 47, 95 A. 745 (1915);
Houston Gas & Fuel Co. v. Harlow, 297 S. W. 570 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
See also Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 247 S. W. 810 (1923),
where it was held that the mere unsightliness of a building which is the
usual and natural result of dilapidation, does not make it a nuisance and
a city would have no authority to declare it a nuisance for that reason alone.
10 306 Pa. 530, 160 A. 108 (1932).
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ance resulting from the proposed practice of parking cars
on the roof of the building.
A new cognizance of aesthetic considerations has been
taken by the courts in the "funeral parlor" cases. Most
courts have held that although a funeral parlor is not a
nuisance per se, it may be enjoined as a nuisance in fact
when it is maintained in close proximity to residential
property.11 In an attempt to justify the use of the injunc-
tive power under the concept of a nuisance, however, sev-
eral courts have added that a funeral parlor causes de-
pressed feelings to persons of normal sensibilities living
in the neighborhood and weakens the powers of some to
resist disease.1"
If excessive noise13 and foul smells" are treated as
nuisances, why should there remain this invidious distinc-
tion against the sense of sight? Although it may be true
that perhaps noise and stench are more objectionable to the
average person and more difficult to avoid than unsightli-
ness, it seems clear that a thing which is visually offensive
may seriously affect the residents of a community in the
reasonable enjoyment of their homes. Of course, equitable
relief should not be granted merely to protect fastidiousness
of taste of a complainant, but only where the injury is of
such a character as to diminish materially the value of
property as a dwelling or seriously interfere with the ordi-
nary comfort and enjoyment of it. 5
A similar protection to the eye would hardly seem to
establish a new principle but would at most simply extend
a recognized one to its logical conclusion.1 6 The instant
case gives little indication whether or not the Court of
n Smith v. Fairchild, 193 Miss. 536, 10 So. 2d 172 (1942); Clutter v.
Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144 S. W. 2d 119 (1940) ; Heimerle v. Village of
Bronxville, 168 Misc. 783, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 1002 (1938).
12 Fraser v. Fred Parker Funeral Home, 201 S. C. 88, 21 S. E. 2d 577
(1942) ; Jack Lewis, Inc. v. Baltimore, 164 Md. 146, 164 A. 220 (1933).
"Swimming Club v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 197 A. 146 (1938).
Fox v. Ewers, 195 Md. 650, 75 A. 2d 357 (1950); Fertilizer Co. v.
Spangler, 86 Md. 562, 39 A. 270 (1898) ; Hendrickson v. Standard Oil Co.,
126 Md. 577, 95 A. 153 (1915).
"Five Oaks Corp. v. Gathmann, 190 Md. 348, 58 A. 2d 656 (1948) ; Hamil-
ton Corporation v. Julian, 130 Md. 587, 101 A. 558 (1917) ; Adams v.
Michael, 38 Md. 123 (1873).
1" Somewhat similarly, legislation to regulate the unsightly use of prop-
erty, inspired solely by aesthetic motives, at one time met with great diffi-
culty under the Federal Constitution. Comment, Ae8thetics and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 860 (1916). But note the language
of the Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 33 (1954) :
"The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well
as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."
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Appeals would be favorably disposed toward such a con-
clusion. The holding, apparently based on a balancing of
the equities of the parties, sidesteps the issue. 7
Roy DIRAooNE
Interpretation Of McGuire Act In Regard To Sales From
Free Trade To Fair Trade Jurisdiction
General Electric Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit recently held in Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters
Mail Order Co.' that a mail-order house located in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, a non-fair trade jurisdiction, could not
be enjoined from advertising in Maryland that fair-traded
articles could be bought in Washington, D.C., at prices be-
low the minimum retail prices in effect in Maryland. That
decision was based exclusively upon an interpretation of
the Maryland Fair Trade Act,3 which was construed to
extend only to advertising made in connection with sales
to be consummated within the State. Since the sales took
place in the District of Columbia, the Maryland statute had
no application.' This decision left open the question
whether, under the McGuire Act,5 any state had the power
to apply its fair trade laws to sales into the state from a
free trade jurisdiction. The Bissell case, supra, was noted
in the MARYLAD LAw PRviEw which pointed out that the
court in that case confined its attention to the Maryland
statute and that "[a] more binding interpretation of the
extent of (the McGuire Act) is still wanting."
Such an interpretation has been proffered by the instant
case. Here plaintiff manufacturer sought to enjoin the de-
1 TBut note that a century ago, the Court of Appeals affirmed a decree
enjoining maintenance of a bawdy house in the vicinity of the plaintiff's
homes, saying:
i . . If, as the authorities show, the court may interfere where the
physical senses are offended, the comfort of life destroyed, or health
impaired, these alone being the basis of the Jurisdiction, the present
complainants, presenting as they do a case otherwise entitling them
to relief, should not be disappointed merely because the effect of the
process will be to protect their families from the moral taint of such
an establishment as the appellant proposes to open in their immediate
vicinity."
Hamilton v. Whitridge, 11 Md. 128, 147-148 (1857).
1244 F. 2d 681 (2nd Cir., 1957), cert. den., Tr. Req. Rep. 67,100, Dkt. 224,
Oct. 14, 1957.
2 240 F. 2d 684 (4th Cir., 1957).
4 Md. Code (1951), Art. 83, 15 102-110.
'Supra, n. 2, 687-8.
a66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U. S. C. A., Sec. 45(a) (1)-(5) (1956).
6 17 Md. L. Rev. 148, 152 (1957). Parenthetical material supplied.
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fendant (the same defendant as in the Bissell case), a Dis-
trict of Columbia mail order discount house, from adver-
tising, offering for sale, or selling plaintiff's products in
New York below the duly-established New York fair trade
prices. Defendant sent goods to New York customers in
response to orders it received by mail in the District of
Columbia. Order blanks had been distributed to prospec-
tive customers by mail and also over the counter in New
York by defendant's parent corporation, a discount house
located in New York. The District Court granted the in-
junction.7 Because of the close supervision by the New
York parent, the sales were considered as having taken
place in New York. The decree was reversed, (2-1), on
appeal. The Court considered the defendant and its parent
to be distinct corporate entities and based its decision on
an interpretation of the McGuire Act.' This statute permits
the states to enact legislation validating resale price main-
tenance contracts, but only in those transactions in which
the resale (or sale) occurs in the state attempting to apply
its statute. The resales here occurred in the District of
Columbia, a non-fair trade jurisdiction, and therefore the
McGuire Act made the New York Fair Trade Act inappli-
cable to these transactions. Judge Clark held that the place
of resale within the meaning of the statute was the place
where title to the goods passed. Buyer and seller intended
to take advantage of the non-fair trade prices in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and since the intent of the parties governs
the passage of title, the District of Columbia was the place
of resale. Judge Waterman concurred in the result but on
the ground that the place of resale was the situs of the re-
tailer. Judge Lumbard dissented for the reasons offered
by the District Court below.
Judge Waterman and Judge Lumbard indicated concern
that the use of the concept of title in determining the place
of resale might open the way to widespread evasion of fair
trade law restrictions.9 Both judges foresaw the possibility
that parties located in the same or different fair trade juris-
dictions could make specific provision for title to pass in
a non-fair trade jurisdiction which had a direct and sub-
stantial relation to the transaction. However, circumven-
tion of the statutes probably is not this easy. Contracting
parties are not given that much latitude in stipulating
where title is to pass. It is generally held in this country
7145 F. Supp. 57 (S. D. N. Y. 1956).
8 Supra, n. 5.
SSupra, n. 1, conc. op. 688, 690, for Judge Waterman's observation; and
dis. op. 691, footnote 2 in Judge Lumbard's dissent.
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that stipulation by the parties that a contract shall be gov-
erned by the law of a jurisdiction which is neither the
place of making nor the place of performance of the con-
tract is valid only if that jurisdiction has a real and natural
connection to the transaction.10 It seems evident, therefore,
that the parties could go no further than to agree that title
is to pass in the jurisdiction where either the vendor or the
vendee is located. It is difficult to imagine any other situs
which would have the necessary natural relation to the
transaction.
A more pointed criticism of the title concept may be
that the legislative history of the McGuire Act seems to in-
dicate Congressional intent that the location of the vendor
should determine the place of resale. Sunbeam Corp. v.
Wentling,' held that the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act did
not apply to sales made from Pennsylvania into other states.
A year later Congress passed the McGuire Act,1 2 the appar-
ent purpose of Section 4 of the Act being to overrule the
Wentling decision.13 It seems obvious that Congress in-
tended that a seller in a fair-trade jurisdiction be subject
to the fair trade prices in that jurisdiction, even when he
sells to out-of-state consumers. Thus the District Court in
Maryland in Sunbeam Corp. v. MacMillan,4 enjoined a
Maryland vendor from selling to an out-of-state buyer at
less than the established fair trade price in Maryland, hold-
ing that the McGuire Act enabled the Maryland statute to
reach this sale.15 It becomes apparent that if the title con-
cept is applied, then the result reached in Sunbeam Corp.
v. MacMillan can easily be avoided by having the parties
stipulate that title is to pass where the buyer is located.
Stated another way, reading the title concept into the
McGuire Act in effect frustrates the purpose for which
Section 4 of the McGuire Act was enacted, i.e., to close the
"Wentling Loophole". MARTN B. GRELD
10112 A. L. R. 124 reviews the cases in numerous jurisdictions to this
effect.
185 F. 2d 903 (3rd Cir., 1950), rev'd. 341 U. S. 944.
"upra, n. 5.
U H. R. Rep. 1437, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 27, 1952). Section 4 pro-
vides that the making and enforcing of fair trade contracts (lawful as
applied to intrastate transactions) "shall (not) constitute an unlawful
burden or restraint upon, or interference with, commerce". (Parenthetical
material supplied.) Also see Sunbeam Corp. v. MacMillan, 110 F. Supp. 836,
842 (D. Md., 1953), which states that "(the language of subsection 4 (of
the McGuire Act) seems very clearly to indicate that . . . Congress was
expressing its public policy to the contrary of the Wentling decision. . .
u Ibid.
1Also see General Electric Co. v. Masters, Inc., 307 N. Y. 229, 120 N. E.
2d 802 (1954), where the New York Fair Trade Act was applied to sales
from a New York vendor to out-of-state consumers.
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Adoption - Age And Religion Of Adoptive Parents.
Frantum v. Department of Public Welfare, 133 A. 2d 408
(Md., 1957). A two month old baby, in poor physical con-
dition, was placed in the home of the petitioner, husband
and wife, ages 54 and 48, respectively, for foster care. The
petitioners nursed the child back to health and filed suit
to adopt after the Department of Welfare refused to con-
sent. The Probation Department of the court recommended
the adoption. Petitioners were of the Lutheran faith, but
the Catholic mother of the child had requested the child
be reared a Catholic. The chancellor dismissed the petition
primarily because of the advanced age of the foster parents;
secondarily, because of the religious difference. The order
was affirmed (4-1) on appeal. While Maryland law has
established only a minimum - and not a maximum - age
for adoptive parents, the age of the prospective parents was
an important factor. It was held to be in the child's best
interests to be placed in the home of younger parents, even
though the petitioners were found to be "fine people", had
given the child love and affection and had done an "excel-
lent job" in nursing the baby back to good health. More-
over, it is the declared legislative policy of the state that
the adoption be by persons of the same religious belief as
the minor or his parents "whenever practicable", Md. Code
Supp. (1957), Art. 16, Sec. 76. The Court pointed out that
this statutory provision was not mandatory but held it prac-
ticable, nevertheless, to apply it in this case. (Ed. Note:
Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, Nov. 25, 1957).
This is the first adoption case in Maryland where the
age of the prospective parents has been considered such an
important factor. Ex parte Anderson, 199 Md. 316, 86 A. 2d
516 (1952), cited by the Court as authority for this prin-
ciple, denied an adoption petition almost exclusively on the
bases that the petitioner was high strung and had retarded
the development of the child. In reference to the question
of religion, Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N. E. 802
(1907), construed a statute similar to the one in Maryland
as preferring the welfare of the child to the wishes of the
natural parents, and allowed the adoption. Cases denying
adoption on this ground are collected in 23 A. L. R. 2d 702
(Supp. Serv. 1957, 1422).
Corporations - By-Law Restricting Transfer Of Stock
Must Be Stated On Certificate. Hopwood v. Topsham Tele-
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phone Co., 132 A. 2d 170 (Vt., 1957). Plaintiff purchased 2
shares of stock of defendant corporation and brought an
equity suit to compel defendant to transfer title to him on
its books. Defendant resisted the suit on the grounds that
the plaintiff, at the time of acquisition, had knowledge of
non-compliance with the corporation's by-law, which pro-
hibited the sale of any stock before first being offered for
sale to the board of directors. By Vermont statute, Ver-
mont St. (1947), Sec. 5880, there shall be no restriction on
the transfer of stock unless said restriction is stated on the
certificate. No restrictions were stated on the shares in
question. The trial court's grant of relief to plaintiff was
affirmed on appeal. The statutory requirement is absolute
and is not limited to good faith purchasers without notice.
Notice cannot take the place of compliance with the statute.
Decisions in at least two states are contra, Baumohl v.
Goldstein, 95 N. J. Eq. 597, 124 Atl. 118 (1924), and Doss v.
Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N. E. 801 (1930), holding
that this statutory requirement is not for the protection of
purchasers having notice of the corporation's by-law re-
stricting the stock's transferability. 6 U. L. A., Stock Trans-
fer, Sec. 15. Both of these cases were distinguished by the
Vermont court because in each instance the purchaser was
an officer of the corporation and thus stood in a fiduciary
relationship to the other stockholders. The statute here in-
volved is part of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, Md. Code
(1951), Art. 23, Sec. 110, and has not yet been construed by
the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Husband And Wife - Husband's Liability For Wife's
Attorney's Fees In Divorce Suit - Effect Of Reconciliation.
In Re De Pass, 97 S. E. 2d 505 (S. C., 1957). A month after a
wife instituted divorce proceedings against her husband,
they were reconciled and the wife notified her attorney to
withdraw the suit. The attorney petitioned the court to
award him attorney's fees as against the husband before
dismissing the case. The trial court refused the request,
and the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed. To
allow the award, which would necessarily require the con-
tinuance of the litigation against the will of the parties,
would contravene public policy, which is to induce recon-
ciliation. The decision is in accord with the rule in a ma-
jority of jurisdictions. Several states, however, allow con-
tinuance of a divorce suit after reconciliation for the sole
purpose of decreeing attorney's fees of wife. See 45 A. L. R.
941, supplemented in 59 A. L. R. 355, discussing this conflict.
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Although this point has never been specifically decided
in Maryland, the Court of Appeals in McCurley v. Stock-
bridge, 62 Md. 422 (1884), sustained an action by a wife's
attorney, in an independent suit against her deceased hus-
band's estate, for counsel fees incurred by the wife in her
divorce action, which was terminated by her husband's
death and before any decree was issued. The prosecution
of a reasonably justifiable divorce suit against husband is
one of the "necessaries" of wife that is chargeable to hus-
band. The general rule in the United States is contra, not
allowing this type of recover by an attorney even in an in-
dependent suit against husband. See 25 A. L. R. 354, 42
A. L. R. 315.
Liens - Status Of Judgment Creditor As Against
Administrator. Smith v. Citizens National Bank In Okmul-
gee, 313 P. 2d 505 (Okla., 1957). An heir was indebted to the
deceased for an amount greater than his distributive share.
The administrator claimed set-off and refused to give him
a share in the estate. Plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the
heir, filed suit to compel the distribution of the heir's one-
fourth share in real property, since his judgment had been
docketed before the death of the intestate. The trial court's
dismissal of the petition and distribution to the other heirs
was reversed by the intermediate court but reinstated by
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Under Oklahoma statute
intestate real and personal property passed through the
administrator and as a result the distributive share was
subject to a set-off of any amount owed by the heir to the
deceased. This equitable lien was superior to that of ajudgment creditor.
The jurisdictions appear to be about equally divided on
this point. Courts adopting the orthodox theory, that realty
passes at once to the heir, do not give the administrator
such a lien; whereas in those states requiring intestate
realty to pass through probate, the courts feel justified in
giving the administrator a preferred lien before granting
the heir his distributive share. 3 AEi. LAw OF PROPERTY
(1952) Sec. 14.26. Cf, TuRENTNE, WILLS AND ADMINIsTRA-
TION (1954).
In Maryland in the case of intestacy title to land vests in
the heirs immediately upon the ancestor's death. Rowe v.
Cullen, 177 Md. 357, 9 A. 2d 585 (1939). Therefore, in Mary-
land the administrator should be in the same position as
every other creditor. It is well settled that as among credi-
tors, the one with the prior judgment lien prevails; Mes-
singer v. Eckenrode, 162 Md. 63, 158 A. 357 (1932).
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Option - What Constitutes An Acceptance. Hunter
Investment v. Divine Engineering, 83 N. W. 2d 921 (Iowa,
1957). The parties entered into a five-year lease giving the
lessee a two-year option to purchase, the rentals paid to
the date of the exercise of the option to be applied to the
purchase price. Before the expiration date, the lessee told
the lessor, "We are going to exercise the option." The lessor
refused to discuss the matter. No further action was taken
until more than a year after the expiration date, when the
lessor filed suit to quiet title to the premises and the lessee
counterclaimed for specific performance of the option. The
lower court's decree in the lessor's favor was affirmed on
appeal. The acceptance of an option must be unqualified
and unequivocal. Lessee's actions indicated only a possible
future intent to purchase.
In Foard v. Snider, 205 Md. 435, 109 A. 2d 101 (1954),
the optionee wrote the owner a letter which (1) expressed
an intention to purchase and purported to be an exercise
of the option right, (2) demanded that the owner give up
possession of the land, but (3) refused to pay part of the pur-
chase price called for by the agreement. The Court allowed
the optionee to purchase the land but required him to pay
the total stipulated purchase price. However, the question
was avoided as to the sufficiency of this letter as an effectual
acceptance of the option, because this issue had not been
raised in the pleadings. Trotter v. Lewis, 185 Md. 528, 45
A. 2d 329 (1946) held that tender of the purchase price
constituted due acceptance of an option. The Maryland
cases emphasize that in addition to being "positive and un-
equivocal", the act purporting to be an exercise of the
option (like any acceptance of an offer of contract) must
be that act which the option prescribes as an acceptance
or exercise.
Tenancy In Common - Tax Sale - Wife Of Co-Tenant
As Purchaser. Beers v. Pusey, 132 A. 2d 346 (Pa., 1957).
Plaintiffs and X were co-tenants of a tract of land. X's wife
purchased the entire property at a public tax sale. The
lower court decreed reconveyance to plaintiffs of that part
of the land they formerly held as tenants in common
with X. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. A
co-tenant cannot buy at a tax sale for he stands in a con-
fidential relationship to the other tenants. In light of the
wife's knowledge of the facts and dower interest, public
policy dictates that this disability be extended to her not-
withstanding statutes emancipating married women from
common law disabilities on account of coverture.
RECENT DECISIONS
It has been held consistently that purchase of an out-
standing title or incumbrance by one tenant inured to the
benefit of the other co-tenants, 86 C. J. S., Tenancy in
Common, 442, Sec. 59, even where the tenant purchased
from a stranger who purchased at the sale, 86 C.J.S. 434,
n. 46. These questions have not been squarely presented to
the Maryland court. Assuming, however, that the Mary-
land Court would follow the majority of jurisdictions in
holding that a co-tenant cannot buy in at a tax sale, the
reasons offered by the Pennsylvania court for similarly
restricting the wife would seem to be equally applicable in
this state. Md. Code (1951), Art. 45 does remove the com-
mon law disability of a married woman to hold property.
On the other hand, the Maryland wife does have the same
dower right and presumably would have the same "knowl-
edge of the facts" which was fatal to the wife's assertion of
an independent right to purchase the property in the in-
stant case.
Wire Tapping - Admissibility Of Evidence Procured
Contrary To Statute. Manger v. State, 133 A. 2d 78 (Md.,
1957). This is the first case arising under the recently en-
acted Maryland Wire-Tapping Statute, Md. Code Supp.
(1957), Art. 35, Secs. 100.107. In substance, the Act makes
admissible evidence procured through wire-tapping only if
the wire-tapping was authorized beforehand by a court
order. Police, without an order of court, tapped telephone
wires leading to a certain house and overheard conver-
sations (in which defendants were not involved) concern-
ing the placing of bets on horse races. On this basis, a
search warrant was issued for the premises and executed
upon. The defendants were found in the house and arrested
for violation of the gambling laws. Evidence of bookmak-
ing was seized during the raid and admitted at the trial
over defendants' objection. The conviction was affirmed on
appeal and the evidence thus obtained was held admissible.
The Court assumed for purposes of argument the correct-
ness of the defendants' contention that the statute, if
applicable to the case, made incompetent not only evidence
as to conversations overheard by the unauthorized wire-
tapping, but also evidence obtained as a result of unlaw-
fully overhearing said conversations - in this case, the
evidence seized in the raid. But the Court, pointing to the
analagous situation of search and seizure, stated that the
Wire-Tapping Statute, supra, must be construed with refer-
ence to the Bouse Act, Md. Code Supp. (1957), Art. 35,
Sec. 5, which makes incompetent evidence obtained "by,
19571
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through, or in consequence of" an illegal search or seizure,
in trials for misdemeanors. Rizzo v. State, 201 Md. 206, 209,
210, 93 A. 2d 280 (1952), held that one could not invoke the
Bouse Act if he had no interest in the premises or property
illegally searched or seized. Likewise, one who is not a
participant in the intercepted telephone conversation (un-
less perhaps his own telephone is the one tapped) cannot
invoke the protection of the Wire-Tapping Statute; and
such evidence unlawfully obtained is admissible against
him. The defendants here were not talking on the tele-
phone when the wires were tapped. On admissibility or
evidence obtained by Wire Tapping, see 3 Md. L. Rev. 266
(1939) and 13 Md. L. Rev. 235 (1953).
Workmen's Compensation - Claims By Common Law
Wife And Illegitimate Child. Humphreys v. Marquette
Casualty Company, 95 S. 2d 872 (La., 1957). This was a
Workmen's Compensation proceeding by the common law
wife and illegitimate child of a deceased workman. The
trial court decreed an award only to the child. In affirming
the judgment, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana declared
that a common-law wife is not entitled to compensation
under the statute either as a "surviving widow" or as a
dependent member of the deceased workman's "family",
since common law marriages are not recognized in the state.
However, an illegitimate minor living in the household is
considered a member of the family.
Recovery under the Maryland Act is based solely upon
dependency and not relationship. Md. Code (1939) Art.
101, Sec. 48(4) precluding one from being a dependent
who was not a wife, stepchild, or blood relative of the
deceased, was supplanted by Md. Code (1951) Art. 101,
Sec. 35(8) (d), which left the question of dependency to
the State Industrial Accident Commission. The leading
case of Kendall v. Housing Authority, 196 Md. 370, 76 A.
2d 767 (1950), declared that the effect of this amendment
was to eliminate the requirement that a dependent be re-
lated to the deceased employee by blood or marriage. The
claimant, who cohabited with the deceased for ten years
prior to his fatal injury, but had refused to marry him
because of religious scruples, was awarded compensation.
That common law marriage was not recognized in Mary-
land did not bar recovery. This same Code section also
abolished the requirement that an illegitimate child live in
the household of the deceased workman to be entitled to
compensation. See Brooks v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 Md.
29, 85 A. 2d 471 (1952).
Book Reviews
The Law Of Admiralty. By Grant Gilmore and Charles
L. Black, Jr. Brooklyn. The Foundation Press, Inc. 1957.
Pp. xli, 866. $10.00.
Professors Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black, Jr., of
the Yale Law School, have performed a magnificent ser-
vice to the American Admiralty Bar, as well as to their own
teaching profession, in the publication of their "Law of
Admiralty". The last work in the field was written by
Professor G. R. Robinson in 1939, and since then there have
been fundamental changes brought about by statute and
case law. Moreover, the great fleet of American war-built
merchant vessels recently sold to private operators, and our
own Government's policy of assistance to the American
shipping industry have made admiralty problems more im-
portant as well as more complex. The text of the new work
has been prepared with great industry and scholarly care
over the last two years, and includes not only abundant note
reference to supporting statutes and cases but also refers
to the English language texts, literature, and law review
articles bearing on the various subjects under discussion.
It is thus not only a digest of the law, but also an index of
reference works. An adequate general index, and an index
of over 1700 cases cited, are included.
The style of writing is clear and also interesting. The
authors are, of course, at pains to state the law on the great
number of points discussed as it appears from the latest
statutes and decisions. But the interest of the practitioner,
the student and even the general reader is aroused by the
background history of earlier authorities that is brought in
wherever it can throw light on the development of the law
and the trend of expected decisions to come. And like other
"Monday morning quarterbacks", the authors can point to
many instances where trends appear to run in opposite
directions, or where the judicial progress slows to a stand-
still. The authors never hesitate to speak their minds and
their comments are not always flattering to either judges or
legislators. In considering the development of principles
governing personal injury at sea, the authors say at one
point: '
"The only thing which the agency cases did make
clear was the ease with which last term's dissent could
become this term's majority opinion."
'GiLMoR and BLAcK, 381.
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and again at another point:2
"The argument... illustrates the process of fusion
and confusion which is going on between the Jones Act
theory and unseaworthiness theory."
The quips and froth that leaven the work, that might
otherwise become ponderous, do not detract from the seri-
ous approach of the authors to their main objective - to
show the development and present state of the law. For
instance, there is the trend toward a harmonious and uni-
form admiralty pattern applicable in all ports and to all
situations of a nationwide commerce. In the Jensen case8
a State Compensation Act was held inapplicable to harbor
workers on shipboard, since it "works material prejudice to
the characteristic features of the general maritime law or
interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that
law in its international and interstate relations". And in
the Chelentis case4 the land law of negligence was held in-
applicable to seamen for the same reason, the Court saying:
"[N] o State has power to abolish the well-recognized
maritime rule concerning measure of recovery . . ."
When Chelentis was decided the doctrine of uniformity
restricted the seaman's rights for personal injury recovery,
but with the constant trend to improve the rights of the
admiralty courts' favorite wards (the seamen and ship
workers) the same doctrine, in the Garrett case,5 the
Mahnich case6 and the Sieracki case7 greatly broadened
their rights in the same field. These admiralty decisions
subjecting State law to the supremacy of Federal maritime
law were coming out, as the authors point out, at the
same time that the Supreme Court was establishing the
supremacy of State common law over the general Federal
common law.8
There is necessarily so much in the eleven chapters into
which the book is divided that it will only be possible to
consider in detail some of the newer statutes and decisions
that have affected maritime law since Robinson's text of
1939. It is regretted that the authors have not discussed the
statutes and practice relating to arbitration of maritime
Op. cit. ibid, 303.
8 Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 216 (1917).
' Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 382 (1918).
6 Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239 (1942).
0 Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96 (1944).
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85 (1946).0 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
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cases, particularly as they point out' that arbitration has
largely taken the place of litigation in construing charter
parties, adding:
"The infrequency of litigation does not, any more
than in the marine insurance field, imply that the sub-ject is unimportant to the admiralty lawyer."
The book also leaves the practitioner without guidance
or discussion (except for a short note, page 575) of the
statutes and practices relating to the transfer of title of
ships and the recording of documents, matters most im-
portant to the practitioner in searching and certifying ma-
rine titles.
Chapter I describes the sources of admiralty law brought
into our Federal courts by the Constitutional grant of
power. The early lines of demarcation, which excluded ship
construction contracts, ship mortgages, and cases involving
ship damage to land structures from admiralty considera-
tion, have been modified, at least in the two categories last
mentioned, by Federal statute.
Chapter II on marine insurance is most welcome. Recent
texts on admiralty have not treated this subject, although
its importance to the average practitioner cannot be over-
estimated. As the authors point out: 10
"[A] 11 important possibilities of marine loss or lia-
bility are normally insured against.... To consider the
rules and concepts of maritime law without reference
to the all pervading 'insurance angle' is a stultifying
process indeed."
The authors give a satisfactory explanation of usual
marine policy language and various clauses which are
brought in and which are so often in the trade abbreviated
to mere initials, such as F.P.A., F.C. & S., etc. In the recent
Wilburn Boat Company case,1 the Supreme Court, in deal-
ing with warranties in marine policies, appears to desert
the principle of uniformity. Although the insured vessel
in that case plied an inland lake, the principle announced,
as pointed out by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, might equally
apply to the Queen Mary.
In Chapter III the usual business practices relating to
carriage of goods by sea under bills of lading are discussed.
There is a brief review of the structure, both business and
legal, within which international commerce and banking
'Op. cit. 8upra, n. 1, 173.10Ibid, 48.
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310 (1955).
19571
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
are conducted, including the strict requirements relating to
letters of credit and documentary sales based on the trans-
fer of negotiable bills of lading. Here also is reviewed the
law relating to whether ship or shipper (or their respective
underwriters) suffer for loss or damage to goods in ocean
transit. This, of course, has been governed for many years
by statutes such as the Harter Act of 1893,12 the Pomerene
Act of 1916," and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of
1936.11 Basic in this area is the age-old conflict between the
ocean shipper and the ocean carrier, which brought about
a change in our own national policy as we developed from
a carrying nation to a predominately shipping nation in the
last half of the 19th Century.
Chapter IV discusses the essentials of the three types of
charter parties - the voyage and time charters under
which the owner has responsibility to man and operate,
and demise or bare boat charters where he does not.
The authors devote a separate chapter to salvage,
general average and collision, including pilotage and tow-
age; also to the American limitation of liability statute.
The new International Rules of the Road of 1954 are re-
viewed. Recent collisions between submarines and operat-
ing trawlers 5 and radar-equipped vessels 8 show that
neither rules nor science can assure absolute safety at sea.
In considering the amounts awarded in salvage cases by the
courts, the authors show that the general principles govern-
ing awards are clear, but that every case stands on its own
facts. The authors refer to the excellent tabulation of
American salvage awards in the six Digests of American
Maritime Cases covering the period 1923-1952, a table com-
piled like the corresponding English table appearing in
Lloyd's List Digest.
In discussing whether owners' insurance should be sur-
rendered to claimants in limitation of liability cases, the
authors aptly summarize the situation as follows:"
"The battle of the insurance proceeds, like the battle
of Waterloo in the Duke of Wellington's opinion, was 'a
damned close-run thing'."
In 1886 by a 5-4 decision in The City of Norwich case, 8
the Supreme Court held the owner's hull insurance pro-
" 27 Stat. 445-6,46 U. S. C. A. §§190-195 (1928), §196 (1956).
1839 Stat. 538, 49 U. S. C. A. § §81-124 (1951).
1449 Stat. 1207, 46 U. S. C. A. §§1300-1315 (1944), §1302 (1956).
United States v. Woodbury, 175 F. 2d 854 (1st Cir., 1949).
' United States v. The Australia Star, 172 F. 2d 472 (2nd Cir., 1949).
' GLmoaE and BLACK, 713.
118 U. S. 468 (1886).
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ceeds need not be surrendered. In 1954, by the same close
majority, limitation claimants were allowed to reach the
proceeds of an owner's liability insurance, even though the
policy provided that payment should be made only after
the insured "shall have been" held liable in damages.'"
The authors' discussion of maritime liens, including liens
under preferred ship mortgages, is particularly well han-
dled. To know whether a lien exists in any circumstances
is of vital importance to the practitioner, and he must also
know what is its priority rating. The authors introduce the
subject as follows:20
"The beginning of wisdom in the law of maritime
liens is that maritime liens and land liens have little
in common. A lien is a lien is a lien, but a maritime lien
is not."
The subject brings up the disregard which Mr. Justice
Holmes as Supreme Court Justice had for the speculations
of Mr. Holmes as a scholar and writer. In his "Common
Law" he had argued that a lien on a ship for her faults
arose because the ship was to be considered as a person.
In The Western Maid case," the ship was at fault in a col-
lision while owned by the United States. Neither the ship
nor the Government could then be sued, and the question
later arose as to whether the ship, subsequently transferred
to private hands, was liable in rem for the collision lien.
Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out that the idea of the ship as
a person did not go this far and continued:
"But that is a fiction not a fact and as a fiction is
the creation of the law. It would be a strange thing
if the law created a fiction to accomplish the result
supposed.""
Judge Hough, a great admiralty Judge of the Second
Circuit, in a comment several years later said:
"When it comes to hurdling a legal difficulty
Holmes, J. is 'hors concours', but in this effort he has
surpassed himself";28
adding in the words of an old song:
"It ain't so much as wot 'e said,
As the narsty w'y 'e said it."
19 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U. S. 409 (1954).
20 Op. cit. 8upra, n. 17, 483.
2257 U. S. 419 (1922).
Ibid, 433.
Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction - Of Late Years, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 529,
543 (1924).
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Finally, in the chapter on death and injury cases of
seamen and maritime workers the authors trace the great
changes that have recently been made in favor of maritime
labor. For seamen the Jones Act of 1920 opened the way for
recovery from the results of operating negligence, even of
fellow servants, both in the Admiralty Court and on the
law side with a jury. Under a recent decision the Act has
been extended to apply to seamen's injuries even occurring
on land. 4 Still later the hard rule requiring plaintiffs to
elect between recovery under the old Admiralty Rule for
unseaworthiness and recovery under the Jones Act for
negligence set out in the Peterson case2" was greatly soft-
ened in several circuits.2" But the door has been opened
even more widely for maritime labor recovery. Both sea-
men, and stevedores (even though not directly employed
by the ship), are now able to recover for injury from any
unseaworthiness, even resulting from operating negligence
of the vessel's crew. The authors point out that very little
more help could be given by the courts to the maritime per-
sonal injury claimant, although the final rule has probably
not been set as to where the ultimate loss should fall as
between the shipowner and the employing stevedore com-
pany when a harbor worker is injured on board ship with
the fault of both parties contributing. The development of
this part of the law is set forth with detail and precision.
It takes no gift of prophecy to state that the new text-
book will be promptly installed in the working libraries of
the Maritime Law fraternity.
RoBER W. WILLIAMS*
The Law Of AWOL. By Alfred Avins. New York.
Oceana Publications. 1957. Pp. 288. $5.00.
The need or reason for such a volume might not be
apparent to the average lawyer. However, the need for
some knowledge of military law is becoming more wide-
spread and the opportunity for utilizing such knowledge
could well present itself to the average practicing attorney
more often than might be supposed.
"O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Co., 318 U. S. 36 (1943).
"2 Pacific Co. v. Peterson, 278 U. S. 130 (1928).
"McCarthy v. American Eastern Corporation, 175 F. 2d 725 (3rd Cir.,
1949) ; Balado v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., 179 F. 2d 943 (2nd Cir., 1950).
91 Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96 (1944), as to seamen; Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85 (1946), as to stevedores.
* Of the Baltimore City Bar.
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Since the adoption of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice in 1951,1 the need for qualified counsel in the mili-
tary system has been greatly expanded and civilian counsel
is being called upon more and more to defend persons
charged under the Code. In addition, with the great num-
ber of lawyers still holding Reserve Commissions the oppor-
tunity for many attorneys to be called upon to prosecute or
defend cases under the U. C. M. J. is not unlikely.
This volume is devoted primarily to the military offense
known as Absence Without Leave - AWOL. However,
the author also touches upon the related offenses of deser-
tion of which AWOL is a lesser included offense, failure to
repair and the similar offenses so closely related.
The military offense known as Absence Without Leave
has been the plague of military commanders throughout
the centuries and has been a violation of military law appar-
ently as long as recognized warfare. As the author points
out - the greatest percentage of court martials arise from
violation of Article 862 of the Code of Military Justice:
Absence Without Leave. In fact, AWOL always has been a
major problem in the armed forces and it has been esti-
mated by the United States Bureau of Navy Personnel that
such AWOL has cost the armed services over $100,000,000
a year in lost time and official action. During World War I
slightly over half of all the offenses in the United States
Army were AWOL cases and during World War II an even
larger proportion of the offenses committed were AWOL.
In view of the tremendous volume of such offenses, the need
for a text on this subject becomes apparent.
This small volume should go far to fill such a need, par-
ticularly among military lawyers as well as officers not
necessarily trained in the law, who may be called upon to
prosecute or defend within the military system, the military
offense known as Absence Without Leave and the related
offenses to it.
Although the author has drawn heavily on other great
military legal writers who have preceded him, particularly
Colonel William Winthrop, his work represents a great
amount of research into the early codes and treatises and
effectively traces the history of this military offense down
to the present day. The volume is not strictly a text book
nor a case book - it partakes somewhat of both, and the
author has drawn heavily on military precedents from our
'64 Stat. 108 (1950), 50 U. S. C. A. §§551-736 (1951). Note that the
U. C. M. J. is now contained in 10 U. S. C. A., "Armed Forces".2 Ibid, §680 (10 U. S. C. A. §886).
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own Military Court of Appeals, the Court Martial reports
dating back to Colonial Days, and the Court Martial records
of Great Britain and the English speaking world whose
military law actually stems from the common law as does
our own. Numerous citations of cases from Australia, the
Malay States and India as well as Great Britain and Canada,
appear.
He has dealt fully with the offense of AWOL and other
related offenses under the Military Code and the elements
which must be proven in order to make out the offense, that
is, the breaking off of military control, what constitutes
absence in a legal sense, the duration of the absence and its
termination. He has also dealt fully with the various de-
fenses which are available in such cases including impossi-
bility, mistake of fact, illegal orders, the "de minimis rule"
and condonation.
Military lawyers should find the volume valuable as a
quick and ready reference although not an exhaustive
authority. A practicing lawyer should find it valuable for
that occasional case he might be called upon to defend at
some time during his practice or perhaps it could be of
value in a "line of duty" determination in a claim against
the government. It should also be of value to the non-legal
officer administering non-judicial punishment under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice or the Summary Court
officer called upon to dispose of minor AWOL cases.
Difficult legal points have been dealt with in detail and
while minor matters have been touched on lightly, it seems
to contain sufficient discussion of the law to permit even a
non-legal officer to decide a matter according to law and
to do substantial justice in those cases where no review,
or only a limited review, is provided for in the military
legal system.
The book cannot be described as a text book but in some
places it resembles a text book and in others it resembles
a law review article. Some cases are set forth fully and
others only in an abbreviated version. However, the author
has left the subject somewhat in doubt on occasion by a
poorly written abstract of the case at point.
The volume is well indexed and the citations are full
and complete. The wide range of cases covering several
centuries and several countries have been chosen with dis-
cretion to illustrate the points involved.
In addition the book should prove of interest to the
average lawyer who has absolutely no knowledge of the
military legal system and the manner in which cases are
BOOK REVIEWS
tried and reviewed. Furthermore, the cases cited should
be of interest to many average readers for their historical
interest - if for no other. The volume deals with many of
the famous court martials of history, including the trial of
Colonel Fremont in 1847 in the Mexican territory, and the
court martial of Admiral Schley during the Spanish Ameri-
can War, as well as those of the many officers and men
throughout history from the Plains of Runnymede to the
Korean Front, who have had occasion to go AWOL for one
reason or another.
Although this volume represents no great amount of
scholarship, and certainly not much original thinking, it
should serve a useful purpose and prove interesting and
valuable to the officer or lawyer dealing with the military
system of justice and particularly violations known as
AWOL and related offenses.
LEROY W. PPESTON*
Compulsion. By Meyer Levin. New York. Simon &
Schuster. 1956. Pp. 495. $5.00.
The crime of the century was the murder of Bobby
Franks by Leopold and Loeb in 1920. "Compulsion" is the
story of this crime. One reads with a certain snake-eyed
fascination of two teenagers deliberately and coldly plan-
ning and executing a shocking murder. By their confessions
the criminals lead the District Attorney, and Mr. Levin
leads the reader, from the time the murder is conceived to
the time of its execution. This devious path is one of horror,
and from the beginning points up the homosexual relation-
ship which existed between the defendants. In telling the
story of this crime, Mr. Levin produces an historical novel
packing as much suspense and terror as a Hitchcock
production.
The author also succeeds in telling a gripping story of
the notorious trial of Leopold and Loeb. Solely because of
his skill in narrating the essence of the trial of the century,
"Compulsion" is well worth reading, but the reader should
bear in mind that the author is a writer and had been a
newspaper reporter. He is not a lawyer and "Compulsion"
is not a law book; yet he has carefully selected the material
for his account of the trial and has omitted tiresome parts
of the legal record. His narrative of the trial is sufficiently
accurate to please an appellate judge; yet is so free from
* Of the Baltimore City Bar.
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legal terminology that it does not bore or confuse lay
readers. A comparison of the included excerpts of the
authentic closing arguments of the attorneys shows ex-
cellent choice.
There is something extraordinary about this book. One
gets the impression that the author was compelled to write
"Compulsion". He seems to have felt responsible for send-
ing them to prison. After all, as the book discloses, Leopold
and Loeb may never have been apprehended but for Mr.
Levin's detective ability, nor have committed the crime
had the author and other fellow students accepted them
as normal boys. Furthermore, Mr. Levin pondered over
the dramatic material of this book for a period of thirty
years before he commenced to write. That is a long time
to lapse between inspiration and production. From the
shreds of evidence contained in the book it appears that
Mr. Levin may have written "Compulsion" as a means of
making restitution to Leopold and Loeb for the wrongs he
fancied he had done them. He seeks to make this restitu-
tion by answering a question that society specifically asked
in the Leopold-Loeb case and has been asking generally
ever since; namely, why do intelligent and wealthy boys of
cultured families, knowing the difference between right and
wrong, with frightening frequency, deliberately select a
career of criminal conduct and thereby forfeit prospects
of a brilliant and fruitful future?
Mr. Levin is a member of the deterministic school of
conduct and his thesis is that Leopold and Loeb were pre-
destined to commit this crime. Judges who do not agree
with Mr. Levin would hang Leopold and Loeb and retort
that if they were predestined to commit murder they were
also predestined to hang for it. The fallacy in Mr. Levin's
theory is that it offers society no hope for preventing crime
and presupposes that man can learn nothing from his own
or others' experiences. But, on the other hand, it is para-
doxical that judges who hang criminals on the theory the
criminal was predestined to hang, generally feel that they
themselves achieved their judgeship by the proper exer-
cise of their free will, industry and ability. It is odd how
vehemently we claim to achieve the good things of life by
a timely exercise of free will, but whine that the evil days
we suffer are pre-determined - unless success comes to
the other fellow, in which event, such success was pre-
determined.
The author gives a convincing chain of circumstances
supporting his deterministic theory of this crime. It is
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assumed that the crime was the result of a joint venture and
would not have occurred had not the defendants been
brought together by the connivance of their doting mothers.
It is assumed they would not have stayed together had not
their personalities been complementary. These assump-
tions lead the author to reconstruct all of the forces that
went into the formation of the personalities of the crimi-
nals. He discusses with insight the factors which made
Leopold an active homosexual. Leopold's character is
clearly delineated, but Loeb is shown only as a disgusting
and dissolute person who accepts Leopold's sexual advances
for the purpose of putting Leopold within his power.
Leopold, on the other hand, has information of Loeb's crimi-
nal activities which puts Loeb within the power of Leopold.
This reciprocal knowledge induced them to become part-
ners in crime. After the formation of this partnership,
they conceived of committing a "perfect crime". In their
warped minds, perfection was equated with non-disclosure
and equal guilt. It was insurance to both that neither
would "squeal" about the murder. In addition, Leopold
had insurance that Loeb would not disclose his homosex-
uality and Loeb was insured against Leopold disclosing his
prior criminal activity. This was a twisted type of black-
mail generated by their unholy partnership.
Darrow's job as defense attorney was to stop the shed-
ding of blood, and to do this he called upon the medical
profession for an understanding of Leopold and Loeb, and
he pleaded for forgiveness of the boys. The defense psychia-
trists testified to some pretty thin stuff about glands, dreams
and Teddy Bears. A comparison of the psychiatric testi-
mony given in 1920 in this case to forensic psychiatry today
shows the great development that has taken place in that
science. One may reasonably question if the law of crimi-
nal insanity has kept apace with the growth of psychiatry.
One suspects Darrow was at the pinnacle of his remark-
able powers while delivering his argument during those
three days when he alone stood between death and his
clients. It has been thought that Darrow won the case
because his clients were not hanged. This is only partly
true. He won the case because he was able to give the
essence of his experience of seventy years of living in an
argument that will be considered a masterpiece as long as
forensic literature is treasured. He said in part:
"The easy and popular thing to do is to hang my
clients. I know it. Men and women who do not think
will applaud. The cruel and the thoughtless will ap-
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prove. It will be easy today; but in Chicago, and reach-
ing over the length and breadth of the land, more and
more fathers and mothers, the humane, the kind and
the hopeful who are gaining understanding and asking
questions not only about these poor boys but about
their own, - these will join in no acclaim at the death
of my clients. These would ask that the shedding of
blood be stopped, and that the normal feelings of man
resume their sway. And as the days and the months
and the years go on, they will ask it more and more.
But, your Honor, what they shall ask may not count.
I know the easy way. I know your Honor stands be-
tween the future and the past. I know the future is
with me, and what I stand for here; not merely for the
lives of these two unfortunate lads, but for all boys
and all girls; for all of the young and as far as possible,
for all of the old. I am pleading for life, understand-
ing, charity, kindness, and the infinite mercy that con-
siders all. I am pleading that we overcome cruelty
with kindness and hatred with love. I know the future
is on my side. Your Honor stands between the past and
the future. You may hang these boys, you may hang
them by the neck until they are dead. But in doing it
you will turn your face toward the past. In doing it
you are making it harder for every other boy who in
ignorance and darkness must grope his way through
the mazes which only childhood knows. In doing it
you will make it harder for unborn children. You may
save them and make it easier for every child that some-
time may stand where these boys stand. You will make
it easier for every human being with an aspiration and
a vision and a hope and a fate. I am pleading for the
future; I am pleading for a time when hatred and
cruelty will not control the hearts of men, when we
can learn by reason and judgment and understanding
and faith, that all life is worth saving, and that mercy
is the highest attribute of man."
All in all, "Compulsion" is a powerful book. It is a
thriller that should not be read by an imaginative person
alone at night. Although it never satisfactorily explains
the causes of the murder, nevertheless, it is an honest and
thoughtful endeavor to probe more deeply into the riddle
of criminal conduct. It is a step, and not an inconsiderable
one, towards Darrow's objective - understanding.
BARNAU T. WELSH*
* Of the Maryland Bar.
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